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Languaging as Emergent Constraint-satisfying Self-organizing 
Activity: Dialogical context-completing, context-making, and 
context-seeking dynamics1 
Paul J. Thibault2 
Abstract 
Languaging is a manifestation of intelligent human action that enables selves to seek and to co-
articulate functional fits between self and selected aspects of the self's social and cultural 
environments. Selves have open-ended endogenous tendencies that strive for articulation in 
social situations. The final products of these tendencies – specific utterances – have functional 
capacities to enter into co-articulated relations with the other functioning components of larger-
scale socio-affective-cognitive assemblages. Internal processes of microgenetic construction that 
have their origins in the pre-linguistic infra-structure of the self are corporeally schematized and 
entrained to and shaped by global order parameters, e.g., lexicogrammatical pattern. Intrinsic 
functional constraints on languaging activity are the work of a complex non-optimized system 
(the self) that draws on available resources in context-sensitive ways in order to yield social and 
cognitive outcomes. Infant proto-language is a guide to the emergence of these constraints. 
Key Words: articulation, constraint, languaging, microgenesis, proto-language. 
Résumé 
Le langaging est une manifestation de l'action humaine intelligente qui permet à l'individu de 
rechercher et de co-articuler des correspondances fonctionnelles entre lui-même et certains 
aspects de son environnement social et culturel. Les individus ont des tendances endogènes 
ouvertes qui s'efforcent de s'articuler dans les situations sociales. Les produits finaux de ces 
tendances – des énoncés spécifiques – possèdent des capacités fonctionnelles pour entrer dans 
des relations co-articulées avec les autres composantes fonctionnelles d'assemblages socio-
affectifs-cognitifs à plus grande échelle. Les processus internes de construction microgénétique 
qui ont leur origine dans l'infrastructure pré-linguistique du moi sont schématisés 
corporellement, entraînés et façonnés par des paramètres d'ordre global, par exemple un modèle 
lexico-grammatical. Les contraintes fonctionnelles intrinsèques de l'activité langagière sont 
l'œuvre d'un système complexe non optimisé (le moi) qui utilise les ressources disponibles en 
fonction du contexte afin de produire des résultats sociaux et cognitifs. Le proto-langage infantile 
apparaît comme un guide pour l'émergence de ces contraintes. 
Mots clés: articulation, contraintes, languaging, microgenèse, proto-language. 
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À Paolo Fabbri (17th April 1939 - 2nd June 2020), grande 
maestro della semiologia, che ha ispirato e catalizzato 
tante molteplici linee di fuga da esplorare3. 
 
The chief error of psychologists: they regard the more 
indistinct idea as inferior in nature to the clear; but that 
which keeps itself remote from our consciousness and 
which is thus obscure, may on that very account be quite 
clear in itself. The fact that a thing becomes obscure is a 
question of the perspective of consciousness. 
The ‘thing which is obscure’ is a result of the 
perspectives of consciousness, and need not be 
something inherently ‘obscure’. 
NIETZSCHE, Friedrich (2017). Consciousness (528), Book 






The identity of utterances as well as any regularities in a given population of utterances need 
to be accounted for in terms of the individuation processes that historically generated the 
utterance. Moreover, any formal or other regularities of utterances must be accounted for in 
terms of an immanent semiotic structure rather than the external imposing of a form on a 
shapeless and meaningless matter, or the associating or combining of a form with a meaning. 
Utterances and their regularities of pattern are produced and responded to by selves. Selves 
have open-ended endogenous tendencies that strive for articulation in social situations. 
Moreover, the final products of these tendencies — specific utterances — have functional 
capacities to enter into co-articulated relations with the other functioning components of larger-
scale socio-affective-cognitive assemblages. Assemblages are characterised by the fact that the 
component processes that contribute to the formation of the assemblage are not homogenised 
to the whole. Instead, they retain their relative heterogeneity as functioning components in the 
whole rather than being homogenised to it (DeLanda, 2010). 
The first tendency — the striving for articulation of an initial pre-meaning or feeling-meaning 
that has its origins in the unconscious core self — was identified by Werner and Kaplan as a 
dynamic process of 'corporeal schematization' (1984/1963: 17-25). The first tendency is 
concerned with the internal processes that prepare and ready the self for interaction with the 
environment. The second tendency — of the final product to function in larger-scale 
assemblages — yields a final product (e.g., the phonetically or graphically actualized utterance) 
that tends to hide the intensive form-creating microgenetic tendencies that gave rise to its 
actualization. By the same token, the final product will possess both a well-defined set of 
extensive properties and an open-ended set of functional capacities to interact with and to form 
co-articulated relations with the other component processes of a given assemblage. The final 
product is a functionally organised action structure that serves to co-articulate selves to their 
environments. Human selves are the originators and producers of utterances. By means of their 
languaging activity, they have the capacity to interact with other individuals — human and 
non-human, animate and inanimate. They have the capacity to participate in and thus to form 
assemblages of ecosystemic relations, to play a role in complex social arrangements that may 
be distributed across diverse times, places, and persons and in directing its flows of matter, 
                                                     
3 I dedicate this article to Paolo Fabbri. Paolo passed away on 2nd June 2020 in Rimini aged 81 during the final 
stages of the preparation of this article. Paolo supervised my postdoctoral studies in the Istituto di Discipline della 
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energy, and information. In other words, in and through their languaging activity, persons have 
the capacity to affect other individuals of all kinds and to be affected by them. 
We perceive the affordances of utterances at the same time that utterances specify ways of 
orienting to aspects of the affordance layout of the situations in which they are functionally and 
constitutively embedded. Chemero argues that «events are changes in the layout of the 
affordances in the animal-environment system» (2009: 148). Utterances are time-extended 
structures of action produced, for example, by speakers' vocal tract and related gestural activity. 
The articulatory and phonatory dynamics of vocal tract activity enact changes in the vocal tract 
activity that are perceived as the affordances of that activity. Moreover, utterances are 
perceived to relate to situations; they make available information that provides indications 
about the situation rather than the utterance itself. Language is continuous with and a further 
extension of action and perception rather than something radically different from it (see also 
Hodges, 2007: 599-600). Languaging enables languaging agents interactively to constitute 
forms of virtual experience that extend action and perception. The many aspects of linguistic 
meaning are in my view better explained in this way. 
Secondly, whereas meanings as standardly discussed are seen as intentional but non-
phenomenological outcomes of the processing of experience into a symbolic form, I seek to 
maintain the link between languaging, the way languaging is experienced via the language 
stance, and how languaging affects our experiencing of the world. On the short time scales of 
languaging activity, the persons who participate in this activity co-explore and co-perform 
(Stuart & Thibault, 2015: 127-128) each others’ utterance activity. For example, they explore 
by means of their sensorimotor skills and capacities the affordance layouts of the utterances 
they encounter in the flow of the languaging activity between two or more persons in, for 
example, a conversation. This real-time exploratory activity modifies the affordance landscape 
and in so doing it alters what Chemero (2009: 152) calls the «phenomenological-cognitive-
behavioral niche» of the agent(s). The agent’s activity alters the affordance layout, in the 
process the detected changes to the affordance layout feedback to and affect and change the 
agent’s experience, including the development of its ability to perceive and act (Chemero, 
2009: 152). The development of these skills and abilities further alters and extends agents' 
phenomenological-cognitive-semiotic niches.  
In this paper, I outline a view of languaging as action for operating on and transforming social 
realities (Bickhard, 1987). The linguistic pattern that languaging selves learn to articulate and 
to perceive in their own and others' utterances is the phenomenological manifestation of 
'formal' regularities that we actualize and perceive as wordings in languaging activity. A 
wording is not a formal entity. Following Cowley (2011), wordings are nonce events; they 
depend on how we experience the event on a particular occasion on the basis of our prior 
experience of such events in a particular population of languaging agents. Wordings are a 
particular, culturally developed way of experiencing utterance-activity. It is on another level 
that a particular wording that is experienced in a particular utterance on a particular occasion 
is construed as an instance of this or that lexicogrammatical category. In order for a particular 
wording to enter the epistemic domain as an instance of this or that lexicogrammatical category 
there must also be a higher-level experience of a particular wording as being an instance of the 
category in question. The phenomenological basis of our conscious awareness of wordings 
means that wordings have the capacity to affect us in culturally salient ways, including the 
capacity to evoke forms of extended action and perception that are not tied to the here-&-now 
of direct perception (Thibault, 2011a; Verbrugge, 1977). Wordings are the concrete 
manifestation in languaging of intrinsic functional constraints on the operation of languaging 
as action system. I develop this point in detail below. 
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2. Four General Semiotic Constraints on Languaging 
 
Deacon (2003) points out that the semiotic freedom of symbol tokens is constrained by the fact 
that a symbol must be bound to an index that is linked to some external locus — the non-
linguistic experiential topology of things, events, causes, times, places, etc. — on which the 
index is dependent. This dependency relation is necessarily local in character. That is, it must 
be anchored in and retrievable from the currently active part of the experiential topology that 
the utterance is perceived to activate. Deacon's discussion is mainly focused on the referential 
relationships between utterances that are grounded in relation to the objects that they are bound 
to in physical space. However, the deictic functions of utterances are more multifaceted than 
the referential relationships that form the core of Deacon's account. For example, when I 
exclaim « ouch! » in response to being burnt by a hot object or surface that I touch, my 
interjection is linked to a specific location — the hot surface — in the currently active 
experiential topology in this sense. The interjection is also the expression of an affect in relation 
to the property of the object that causes the experience. The interjection is prompted by a 
material context that requires my quick withdrawal from it, for example, when I pull my hand 
away while uttering the interjection. In the interjection, my response action, the interjection, 
and perceptual and affective meanings are fused as a relatively undifferentiated whole. 
The primary impetus or motivation for languaging is the striving on the part of concrete living 
persons, not abstract speaker-hearers or sender-receivers, to complete (some aspect of) the local 
context that is understood to be currently activated. The term local is not restricted to 
perceivable material context though it can include that. Rather, the term local refers to the 
particular contextual conditions that are activated by an utterance at a particular location in the 
experiential topology. If I tell you that I will drop by the green grocer's on the way home from 
work to buy some apples and bananas, my utterance points to and indicates buying apples and 
oranges at the green grocer as the particular location in the experiential topology that is 
currently activated. My utterance is thus locally tied to that place in the particular part of the 
topology that my utterance activates. Any further utterances on the same topic are dependent 
on that context for their functioning. They function locally in and are locally tied to that context. 
There is no need for the green grocer's shop to be materially present though of course in another 
context such as that of buying and selling fruit, my utterances and those of the greengrocer will 
in many respects be tied to aspects of the material context. 
For example, if, when I visit the green grocer's shop, I say to the greengrocer, « Can I have 
three bananas, please? », my utterance is a conventional operator that is locally dependent on 
the presence of the fruit and vegetable shop as one of its contextual conditions. By the same 
token, the utterance also differentiates the contextual conditions required for other utterances 
and actions to occur. My utterance is both dependent on the material context at the same time 
that it sets up the contextual conditions on which the subsequent interaction flow is dependent. 
In each case, the local functioning of utterances in their contexts means that utterances are 
indexically tied to and dependent on the contexts that they evoke (create), or to the context that 
they are dependent on, as shown below: 
 
1. context-creating utterance > evoked context; 
2. context >context-dependent utterance. 
 
Context may include the material context, non-linguistic actions, and so on. It may also include 
other utterances. These local dependency relations are aspects of context completion. This 
striving for contextual completion means that the constraints that give rise to our experience of 
linguistic pattern have concrete effects in the world that can be linked to the context that is 
locally evoked and locally accessible in the interaction. That is, they are linked to the context 
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that is currently understood to be in operation. In other words, they must be accessible in the 
situation that is apperceived to be currently activated. Moreover, we do not impose meaning 
on a meaningless external world. The world we live in is already alive with meaning and value. 
The world imposes its own selection pressures on language form and function. Through 
languaging people operate on and seek to change selected aspects of the « interworlds » (Linell, 
2009: 160; section 6) that they co-create in concert with others in their languaging activity. 
These constraints are selection pressures that contribute to the emergence of linguistic form. 
Utterances are forms of action that serve to co-articulate relations between persons and selected 
aspects of their worlds. Languaging is a highly articulated mode of action that, like all action 
systems, is functionally constrained by its intrinsic functional character. 
As the transition from infant proto-language to language shows (Halliday, 1975; Thibault, 
2004a: chap. 3, 2005a; section 3 below), the emergence of lexicogrammar constitutes the 
development of and provides support for the capacity of persons to participate in languaging 
qua action system and thus to co-articulate functional relations between persons and selected 
aspects of their social worlds. For the purposes of the present discussion, in this section, I 
propose four general semiotic constraints that help to explain the emergence of different aspects 
of language form and function. The four constraints are different facets of an immanent abstract 
semiotic structure that supports the emergence of both the functional capacities of social agents 
to participate in dialogically coordinated languaging and the intrinsic functional organisation 
of languaging that enables and scaffolds agents' capacities. The four constraints affect in 
different ways the relationships between different aspects of the linguistic pattern or structure 
that people perceive in utterances. The four general semiotic constraints are as follows: 
 
1. The positing of an utterance that seeks to elicit or to anticipate potential responses from 
others. Utterances are structures of action that, in common with all forms of action, create 
a modalised field in which the utterance anticipates future interaction potential. 
Utterances anticipate others' responses that complete and contribute to the further 
development of the meaning of the utterance-situation matrix; 
2. The semiotic requirement that utterances thematise a locus of orientation and attention 
that is retrievable in the currently active experiential topology; 
3. The semiotic requirement that the utterance points to (indicates) and differentiates the 
selected locus of attention as that which the utterance is about; 
4. The semiotic requirement that the utterance is in some way dependent on contextual 
relations, or is the means of setting up and creating contextual dependency relations, that 
are available in and therefore retrievable in the local context. 
 
In the following section, I tie these observations to the transition from infant proto-language to 
language in order to show how exogeneous selection pressures deriving from the infant's 
increasing differentiation of situations dialectically inter-penetrates with endogenous dynamics 
to give rise to self-organising form-creating tendencies in response to changing selection 
pressures in the child's social world. 
 
 
3. Emerging Lexicogrammar in the Transition from Infant Proto-language to 
Language 
 
In his paper, On language in relation to human consciousness, Michael Halliday (2003/1995: 
400-403) describes how the transition from the child’s proto-language to the mother tongue is 
epigenetically dependent on « the social-semiotic construction of the self » (2003/1995: 400). 
A fundamental aspect of this process is the transition from a meaning system that has a 
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phonetics and a semantics, but no lexicogrammar (the child’s proto-language), to a system that 
has a lexicogrammar (the mother tongue). It is worthwhile quoting at length the following 
analysis that Halliday provides of this process: 
 
How does the grammaticization of the system of meaning come about? The strategy seems 
to be the fundamental principle of semogenesis, namely that of decoupling -- the 
dissociation of associated variables. This can take place in many different contexts; here is 
the instance I first observed, a few days after the child in question had taken his first steps 
in walking. He had at the time, as part of his protolanguage, three signs that had become 
specialized to the three people in his meaning group, 'mummy', 'daddy', 'anna'; these were 
not yet referring, but were person-specific interactional, and were said always on a high 
level tone (not used in other expressions), as in Figure 3(a). Within a period of two or three 
days he construed this system and reconstrued it as in Figure 18.3(b). The person-specific 
signs have now become names, while the interactional component has been grammaticized 
as a modal opposition of greeting (acknowledging presence) or seeking (overcoming 
absence). In other words, the child now has a proto-grammar consisting of two systems, 
one realized lexically, the other phonologically: the two systems are dissociated, hence 
freely combinable, and each utterance must select in both. In the event, it was another three 
months before the child followed up this development; but in this one move he had 
underpinned a semiotic of a fundamentally different kind. This is the semiotic that 
embodies Edelman's "higher-order consciousness"; it has a new and distinctive kind of 
network, a lexicogrammar, at the core. (If the form of a grammar was genetically 
programmed, why would children first construe a semiotic of another kind, in which there 
is no trace of the grammar at all?) (Halliday, 2003/1995: 402). 
 
Halliday's person-specific interactional system (his Figure 3a) and the new system, consisting 
of the naming and modal systems (his Figure 3.b) are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Halliday's person-specific interactional system (his Figure 3a) and the new system, consisting of 
the naming and modal systems (his Figure 3.b); Halliday (2003/1995: 403) 
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Halliday's account retains the idea that the emergence of lexicogrammar in the child's transition 
from proto-language to language can be explained in terms of the ways in which the three signs 
in the person-specific interaction system can be re-combined with the two phonological tones 
in the modal system. This assumes that the terms in the two systems are independent variables 
that can be brought into new combination. As Halliday's discussion shows, this is based on the 
assumption that « language » is a system of forms and meanings that can be combined and 
recombined in variable ways. Such an account is not compatible with the microgenetic account 
developed in the present paper. According to the latter account, both ontogenesis and 
microgenesis, albeit on very different time scales, involve the morphogenetic progression from 
less differentiated to more highly differentiated formal arrangements. 
Halliday is right to pose the question he does at the end of the paragraph quoted above. Rather 
than starting with a genetically pre-programmed grammar, the developmental transition from 
proto-language to language is a diachronic emergence in which the later system bears traces of 
the vaguer antecedent system, which is contextually integrated to and reorganized by the later 
emergence of the “adult” system. Just as the earliest forms of dyadic communion between 
infant and caregiver are based on the co-synchronization of rhythmic patterns and prosodies of 
affect and arousal that are integrated to and re-organised by the emergence of the “adult” 
system, in the microgenesis of an utterance, antecedent phases of rhythmic synchronization 
and affective prosodies are progressively differentiated from within as full-fledged linguistic 
structures under the guidance of both internal and external selection constraints (section 5). 
The three signs displayed in Halliday’s Figure 3a are cue-specific; they take place in a specific 
context. There is strong coupling between the three terms and the use of the high level tone in 
all three cases. The three signs are « person-specific interactional » (2003/1995: 402) and are 
« specialized to the three people in his meaning group, ‘mummy’, ‘daddy, ‘anna’ »; (Halliday, 
2003/1995: 402). There is tight coupling between each sign and the person with whom the child 
interacts with that sign. The decoupling of articulation from intonation, the grammaticalization 
of the interactional component as « a modal opposition of greeting (acknowledging presence) 
or seeking (overcoming absence) » (Halliday, 2003/1995: 402), gives rise to a grammar 
consisting of the two systems described by Halliday— one realized lexically (the naming 
system) and one realized phonologically by the contrasting tones (the interaction system). 
The newly emergent system yields an expanded set of functional differentiations and their 
possible combinations in the form of the systems of the new, more complex higher-order 
informational invariants that are obtained by the combination of a selection from the interaction 
system with a selection from the naming system. In this way, names can be modulated in the 
two ways shown in order to enact the attainment of a desired goal. However, this does not mean 
that names at this stage afford the ability to reflect on names. That comes later. At the present 
stage, as described by Halliday, names and their modulation by tone afford action in relation 
to the person named. 
For example, the sign /dada + falling tone/ can be glossed as Greeting Daddy; the sign /ama + 
rising tone/ can be glossed as Seeking Mummy. Halliday writes that the emergence of grammar 
is the slotting in between the phonetics and semantics of the prior proto-linguistic system of a 
new, more abstract intermediate level of organization. Halliday's formulation gives the 
impression that the new system is abstracted from the phonetics of articulation and intonation, 
respectively. I would rather say that the decoupling of the articulatory and intonational 
components of the prior system, the differentiation of the latter into two contrasting options 
(falling vs. rising tone), and the potential for the recombination of selections from the naming 
and interaction systems, constitute a re-organization of the phonetics along functional lines, 
not its transcendence. 
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The lexicogrammatical pattern that is detectable in phonetic gestures is only more ‘abstract’ in 
the sense that it yields high-order compound physical invariants resulting from combinations 
of lower-order ones. However, these are always organizations and re-organizations of the 
material dynamics— organizations of patterns of process that the infant learns to attend to, 
articulate, and value. The further point is that the newly emergent component parts and their 
re-combinations act back on and constrain the dynamics of the smaller scale phonetics. In this 
way, functional information for the Person-Utterance-Situation Interaction System arises from 
a re-organization of the physical properties of phonetic gestures instead of being mapped onto 
the gestures as an additional level of abstract ‘form’. 
The new system shows the rudiments of a system that affords both robust tracking of aspects 
of agents' worlds across persons, times, and places without being tied to the here-&-now and 
the attainment of the agent’s goals. The child’s sign both differentiates a functional position in 
the topology — one of the persons he can name in his meaning group — at the same time that 
he coordinates an action — greeting or seeking — in relation to that person. The combination 
of these two possibilities in his sign-making is in accordance with the two subsystems that 
constitute the control mechanisms of the human folk-psychology: robust tracking and goal-
directed representation. 
Languaging is a flexible and adaptive resource that enables what Sterelny (2003: 27-29) calls 
robust tracking. Robust tracking makes use of decoupled representations. The latter enable the 
agent to track aspects of its world without being tied to specific behaviours. The emergence of 
a naming system affords the tracking of the three persons across a more diversified set of 
situations. The ability to name means that the self has a more robust system for recording 
memories and for calling up memories. The robust tracking of aspects of the things named in 
the self's world brings in the arrow of time. The robust tracking of entities through naming 
develops a history. Naming has a direction that can be recorded in time as each new mention 
of the thing named accumulates historical information. Names and the robust tracking they 
afford mean that time becomes an observable. Things named can be evoked as past memories 
or placed in imaginary futures. Imaginary things can be named. By the same token, the naming 
system is no longer tied to a single type of action, but is potentially relevant to the two types 
of action — greeting and seeking — described by Halliday. There is a further important aspect 
of the developmental emergence that I will now discuss. 
The emergent modal distinction between greeting and seeking that is realized by the contrasting 
intonational patterns means that the environment of the child is now perceived to be more 
translucent — the persons who can be named may be present or absent from the purview of the 
child. The intonational modulation of the names means that the choice between ‘falling’ and 
‘rising’ tones now affords the child the capacity for what I will call modalized exploratory 
activity in order to elicit a response from his environment has been expanded. The potentiality 
of the three persons in his meaning world to be either present or absent means that the child’s 
world is now more fluid, more unreliable, more translucent.  
The new system extends the agency of the child. It is important to bear in mind here that the 
various signs described by Halliday are dialogical acts. They are enacted in the child’s 
engagements with the others in his meaning group. It is through these exploratory acts 
performed in concert with others that the child gains a felt sense of his own agency -- his power 
to respond to others when they appear and to summon them to appear when they are absent. In 
other words, he discovers that modulating the act of naming a person (and later different 
objects) by controlling the intonational shape of the utterance can change his phenomenal 
experience. He learns that naming coupled to greeting or seeking is a class of operation on the 
relevant situation that has the capacity to bring off a particular class of situation transformation 
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together with the transformation of experience that this entails. He thus learns to control the 
contentfulness of experience and to draw on a history of such regularities so as to evoke this 
content in his situation-transforming utterance-activity. 
Unlike the prior proto-linguistic system, which featured strong coupling of sign to person in 
the presence of that person, the new system is now more weakly coupled to the physical 
presence of the person named. Perception of the person in the child’s immediate purview and 
action are now starting to become decoupled. The recoupling of the naming and interaction 
systems however has an important payoff. The naming of a particular person indicates from 
the standpoint of the child a particular functional focus of interest and hence of value. If, for 
example, Daddy is absent and the child creates a sign of the type /dada + rising tone/, meaning 
Seeking Daddy, then the child is interactively constituting Daddy as the functional locus of a 
preferred course of action. This decoupling goes hand-in-glove with a further decoupling -- 
that of intrinsic affect from action. Whereas the prior, proto-linguistic system is motivated by 
the infant’s intrinsic, biologically grounded motivations such as hunger, thirst, tiredness, pain, 
pleasure, discomfort, need for company, feeling too hot or too cold, etc., etc., the new system 
decouples intrinsic affect from action. Increasingly, the ability to name goes with the ability to 
produce hypotheses and to anticipate possible outcomes in the imagination that can be 
preparation for action, or which can be tested in (future) action. 
Biologically intrinsic motivations are increasingly dampened without of course being 
altogether cancelled from the picture. If I feel thirsty, I can still ask for a glass of water! Intrinsic 
motivation of this kind is integrated to and reorganized by a system of cultural motivations, 
norms and values as the child progresses into the adult tongue. The newly emergent system 
described by Halliday enables Nigel interactively to explore and change his world in the way 
indicated by the person who is named in his utterance. If Daddy is absent and Nigel wants 
Daddy to be present, he can say /dada + rising tone/ in order, hopefully, to elicit the desired 
response from the environment. The emergence of the distinction between the modal values 
‘greeting’ and ‘seeking’ gives expression to a form of motivation that is shaped by culture as 
distinct from the intrinsic biological motivations that played the dominant role in earlier stages 
of development.  
In the proto-linguistic system, the three signs in Halliday's analysis are indexically tied to 
environmental actualities that are already given in advance. The three proto-linguistic signs 
relate to specific aspects of the child's interpersonal environment and the child's relations to 
them. The selection constraint in each case is the presence in the environment of the person in 
question. The presence of the three persons is part of the structure of the child's world as are 
their comings and goings in the course of the child's daily life. The presence or absence of the 
three persons at any given moment constitute departures from randomness that elicit a proto-
linguistic response from the child. In the first (proto-linguistic) stage discussed by Halliday, 
the selection of the three signs, all on high level tone, is constrained by and dependent is upon 
the presence of the particular person, who constitutes an occasion of interaction potential for 
the child. The selection constraint is simply stateable as follows: THE OCCURRENCE OF THE 
CHILD'S MOTHER IN THE CHILD'S ENVIRONMENT PROMPTS THE CHILD TO UTTER THE SIGN /ÃMÃ + 
HIGH LEVEL TONE/. 
The sign is an elementary operator that operates on and is contextually dependent on its 
argument, i.e., the availability in the environment of the mother as a potential interaction 
partner. In contrast, the later emergence of the expanded system shows a self-organising 
dynamic at work that de-couples the person-specific interactional signs from the high level tone 
and recouples them to an expanded set of possibilities that yield different couplings of 
meanings from two distinct paradigmatic sets, i.e., (1) the names of the three persons; and (2) 
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the tonal distinction between « high fall + mid level ('falling') » and « mid level + high level 
('rising') », indicating a modalised stance on the presence or absence, respectively, of the person 
named. In this case, the tone selected is a modal operator on the name. 
The earlier system was closely tied to particular aspects of the structure of the child's world. Its 
three options are responses to the particular aspect that they indicate. Halliday glosses the three 
signs as « person-specific interactional » (Halliday, 2003/1995: 402). In each case, the presence 
of the particular person affords possibilities of interaction with him or her that constitute 
elementary forms of context-completing and context-making. The child's three person-specific 
proto-linguistic utterances are prompted by the presence of the particular person at the same 
time that they seek to extend the interactional context with that person. The child's utterance in 
the presence of that person has the potential to elicit further interaction. 
On the other hand, the expanded system with its possibilities for combining and recombining 
the naming and modal systems described by Halliday, means that the child now has expanded 
possibilities for creating information about the world. The co-occurrence structures of the 
newly expanded system are probabilities of co-occurrence of linguistic structure that enable 
the child to create information about his world that is not directly tied to the probabilities of 
co-occurrence of things and events in the world, on the one hand, and the child's proto-linguistic 
utterances, on the other. The self-organising dynamics of the newly expanded system enable 
the child to create information about things and events that are not necessarily present. Whereas 
the earlier system is a modal response to the presence of a specific person, the later system is 
not dependent on fully realised presences in the world. Instead, the later system provides the 
child with an expanding set of modal capacities and concomitant viewpoints that enable him 
to explore and seek to actualize the virtual potentialities of the world. 
For example, in saying /ÃMÃ + HIGH LEVEL TONE/ ('where's mummy?'), the child is not referring 
to an already given presence consisting of fixed properties or essences that that the sign names 
or 'stands for'. Instead, the child is seeking to guide and to actualize a process of context-making 
which his utterance posits and differentiates. The absence of his mother in the situation 
motivates languaging that seeks to make her present and thus to complete or fill in a felt lack 
in the material context. The information-creating capacities of languaging mean that it has the 
capacity to individuate things and events which are not given in advance and which are not 
already included in the utterance that initiates this process--a process of actualization and 
individuation of the virtual potential of the world. The utterance /ÃMÃ + HIGH LEVEL TONE/ 
('where's mummy?') does not yield some set of pre-determined possibilities. Rather, it 
functionally constrains the activation of trajectories of becoming that constitute the further 
development of the meaning potential of the utterance. How the world, including other persons, 
responds to the child's utterance are not pre-given in advance. The utterance is a modal 
exploration of some aspect of the virtual potentialities of the world. These potentialities may 
be actualized in a plurality of ways that are functionally constrained and/or enabled by the 
utterance though they are not determined by it. 
The two terms in the system of tone in Halliday's example are modal values that deictically 
point to the completion or resolution of the local context (high fall + mid level ('falling'), on 
the one hand, or to the anticipation of its future development (mid level + high level ('rising'), 
on the other. For example, the utterance /dada + falling tone/ is a modal response to the presence 
of the father in the local context. The presence of the father is the material contextual condition 
that prompts the utterance and on which the utterance is dependent. The child's dependent 
utterance completes the local context. The falling tone in the child's utterance points to and 
evaluates the father's presence as a resolved or complete local context that presents 
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opportunities for further interaction. The child indicates his father to be close by and able to 
satisfy his needs. 
On the other hand, the utterance /dada + rising tone/ deictically points to the father's absence 
or distance from the local context at the same time that it articulates the modalised desire for 
the contextual completion of the local context in the form of the father's presence. Rising tone 
evaluates the local context as incomplete and in need of completion. It is a modal operator that 
articulates an anticipatory dynamic. It anticipates and seeks the completion of the context at 
some future stage. It articulates an unresolved contextual tension that requires resolution and 
therefore the restoration of contextual harmony. In this sense, rising tone in the utterance 
indicates context-seeking. It is deictically oriented to the seeking, resolution, and completion 
of the given local context -- the absence of the father -- in the future. In the child's newly 
expanded system, the two tones function as modal operators that modulate the three names in 
the child's system for interactional purposes at the same time that they deictically point to the 
child's felt closeness to or farness -- physical and interpersonal -- from the person who is 
indicated by the utterance. 
The four general semiotic constraints proposed above can be seen as selection pressures on the 
child's utterances as follows: 
 
1. The utterance posits an affectively charged modalised view of relations of felt 
closeness to or farness from the important persons that he interacts with in his daily life. 
For example, the falling tone in /dada + falling tone/ deictically specifies the father's 
physical presence in the material context as a perceptual and affective closeness that 
provides an occasion for interaction with him. The child's utterance is an operation on 
this field that seeks to modify it in some way, e.g., getting the father's attention and 
engaging in interaction with him. The utterance thus serves to connect the child to his 
father by means of a modally charged interactive stance that has the potential to be taken 
up by the father and acted on. This possibility is constrained by and is dependent on the 
ways in which the participants in an interactive encounter have properties and motives 
that are only partially apprehended by others and which depend on the fact that the 
different persons who interact do so with reference to their respective viewpoints, which 
are deictically anchored to their embodiment. For example, if the child thinks his father 
will engage with him when he says /dada + falling tone/ then this expectation, which is 
an implicit modal value, has the potential to shape the situation between them. Their 
different perspectives, together with their different wants and needs, are selection 
constraints that give rise to an interest in coordinating their viewpoints in order that they 
can satisfy the constraint that they develop a dialogically coordinated solution to the 
problem of reaching a shared understanding; 
 
2. The utterance thematises a locus of orientation and attention that the utterance is about. 
For example, /dada + falling tone/ thematises the presence of the child's father in the local 
context as the current locus of orientation and attention; 
 
3. The utterance /dada + falling tone/ differentiates 'dada' as distinct from 'ama' or 'an:a' 
as the current locus of perceptual and cognitive processing. The three terms specify 
different locations in the emerging experiential topology. The utterance /dada + falling 
tone/ points to a given location in the currently active experiential topology and 
differentiates it by selecting 'dada' rather than either of the other two terms. The selection 
of 'dada' is not an encoding of the father's presence, but an indication as to which part of 
the topology is currently active and is to be attended to. It functions not by encoding a 
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current actuality, but by differentiating or partitioning the topology in contextually 
relevant ways; 
 
4. The utterance is dependent on the given local contextual condition — the presence of 
the father — in order for it to occur. Consider the relations between the contextual 
conditions specified below and their respective utterances: 1. material context: presence 
of father > /dada + falling tone/ > contextual completion > opportunity for further 
interaction in the present; 2. material context: absence of father > /dada + rising tone/ > 
anticipation of desired future contextual completion > opportunity for further interaction 
in the future. In both cases, there is a dependency relation between the child's utterance 
and the material context that motivates the utterance. The material context — presence 
or absence of father — differentiates the local conditions that are required for one or 
other of the two utterance types to occur. These relations of dependency must occur 
locally if the relevant conditions are to be satisfied. In both cases, the child's utterance is 
an operator on its context that is locally dependent on a particular contextual condition 
for the utterance to function. Moreover, the particular contextual condition must, at the 
time of utterance, hold at a particular location in the overall topology. This requirement 
of unique contextual location and its accessibility is therefore a selection constraint on 
the utterance and its formal organisation. In each case, the particular contextual condition 
— the presence or absence of the father — is a context-creating operator on which the 
utterance is dependent. In the adult language system, utterances may themselves function 
as the contextual conditions that are required for other utterances to function. In such 
cases, the dependency relation is between utterances. For example: Manure is best dug 
in when it is rotting. The second clause when it is rotting is a temporal operator that 
specifies the contextual condition that must be satisfied for the action indicated in the 
first clause, Manure is best dug in, to occur. In this case, the sentence, which occurred in 
a book on growing vegetables, is a virtual rehearsal of an activity that can be potentially 
actualized in some material context. The virtual potential of the utterance therefore 
anticipates its integration to and actualization in material contexts when the relevant 
contextual condition applies. Circumstances, whether expressed adverbally or clausally, 
as in the example, are local constraints on the situation that is indicated by the utterance. 
 
Halliday's argumentation relies on the idea that independent variables are 'combined'. This way 
of thinking derives from associationistic psychology (section 7). Instead, I argue that the 
transition that he documents arises from the dialectical inter-penetration of endogenous and 
exogenous factors. The striving from within to articulate an increasing range and diversity of 
relations between self and its 'objects', on the one hand, and the increasing demands of an 
increasingly complex and mobile context, on the other, select for increasing differentiation and 
integration. The self strives to co-articulate to its contexts and their objects by means of its 
utterances. In the initial system described by Halliday, the child's three person-specific 
interactional signs are contextually dependent on the presence of the person in question. 
Speaker, utterance, and the presence in the local context of the given person are relatively 
undifferentiated facets of a single global configuration, or utterance-situation matrix. In time, 
the child is more aware of and attuned to the comings and goings of the three persons. The 
context is increasingly mobile. At times, his father, for example, is present; at other times he is 
absent. This contextual dynamism is a selection constraint that selects for the differentiation of 
these two different situations — presence or absence of the person — and the differentiation 
of the child's stance with respect to the situation. I return to the second point below. 
The three signs in the new system, [ama], [dada], [an:a] are now called upon to provide 
information that is constituted by the utterance itself rather than being redundant with 
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information available in the material context, i.e., the physical presence/proximity of the three 
persons in the child's world. The three signs no longer function as indexicals that are contiguous 
with the given person in the material context though of course they can still also have this 
function. In the new system, they have the increased information-constituting capacity to evoke 
and make present in the imagination a person who is not physically present. In the Seeking 
mode, they articulate a desire to complete a material context that is incomplete. The internal 
re-organisation of the child's languaging and the building in of more and more intrinsic 
functional constraints is in response to the felt need on the child's part to fill in the context or 
to seek its completion by linguistic or other means. 
Secondly, the modulation of these person-specific signs by the two phonological tones that 
now arise in the child's system is in response to the contextual need to specify an expanding 
range of interactive stances and their associated modal expectations. The possibilities of 
modulating vocal tract action are accordingly expanded and re-territorialized as the child 
explores new social possibilities. Again, the two tones are differentiations from within that are 
selected for by constraints and requirements arising in the expanding and increasingly mobile 
context of the comings and goings of the persons in the child's world. They are modal stances 
of a self whose objects are expanding and diversifying, thus requiring an increasingly 
differentiated and articulated range of responses of the self. 
The child's utterances acquire additional intrinsic functional organisation. The information in 
the child's utterances is, as Harris well explains, not simply « an unordered collection of 
departures from equiprobability, but a specific structure consisting of one step acting on 
another » (Harris, 1991: 355). Thus, the system of the three person-specific names is a system 
of three operators that act on the material context of either the presence of absence of the person 
named. The system of modal stances specified by the two phonological tones operates on and 
modulates the shape of the particular name that is selected for specific interactional purposes 
(McGregor, 1997: 64-70). The name is an operator that operates on the material context. The 
tone is an operator that operates on the name and modulates its articulatory and acoustic shape. 
The resulting specific structure consists of a number of overlaid intrinsic functional constraints 
that together create a structure of information that has the capacity to complete or to seek the 
completion or resolution of the local context precisely because the utterance adds information 
that is not available from or reconstructable from the information in the material context, at 
least not from the child's perspective at this stage of his development. 
Halliday argues that lexicogrammar is an intermediate level that arises between the situated 
phonetics and semantics of the prior proto-language. In my view, the key to understanding this 
dynamic lies rather in the social semiotic development of the self and its relations to its objects 
that Halliday mentions but does not develop as a significant line of argument, given his focus 
on the transition from the proto-language to language. 
The three-level scalar hierarchy view developed by Salthe (1993: 36-52) in the field of 
developmental biology is a useful tool that helps us to think in a clear way about the different 
kinds of levels involved without pretending that the levels are neatly separable from each other. 
The middle level (L) is always the focal level. The choice of a focal level depends on the 
purposes of the theorist or analyst. The focal level is so defined because that is the ‘object’ or 
‘entity’ that is the main concern of the analysis. The choice of focal level is therefore 
determined by the interests of the analyst. Level L is the focal level. Level L-1 refers to 
processes below Level L. Level L+1 refers to processes above the focal level. 
Lower levels can be understood in terms of the way they are contextually integrated to higher 
levels in the hierarchy. Higher levels have emergent properties and processes that are not 
reducible to lower ones. Thus, meanings qua attractors in a possibility space – a semiotic 
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system – manipulate and entrain lower-scalar physical-biological processes to their own ends 
so that new configuration and arrangements of lower scalar processes and entities arise. These 
new arrangements are more highly structured and more highly specified with respect to the 
lower scalar processes such that the higher-scalar system is able to interpret lower scalar 
processes. The reverse is not, generally speaking, the case because lower scalar entities are not 
sufficiently structured to do so. Semiotic systems are therefore global meta-semiotic 
phenomena which range over and constrain local phenomena. For present purposes, the three 
levels are as follows: 
 
Level L+1: The social semiotic environment of the child's interactions with the three 
persons distinguishes six newly emergent situation-types, i.e., the presence or absence of 
the three persons in question; 
Level L: The child's utterances manifest new organisations of intrinsic functional 
constraints that serve (1) to acknowledge the presence of the person when that person is 
present, or to seek his or her presence when the person is absent; and (2) to modulate this 
expression of presence or absence with a choice of falling or rise tone that articulates a 
modal stance. The self in interaction with the three persons strives to respond to and to 
co-articulate the self to an expanding range of contextual demands. The child's utterances 
now build more of the context into his utterances; 
Level L-1: The self in interaction with the three persons strives to articulate responses to 
the expanding range of contextual demands by re-shaping neural and bodily dynamics in 
new ways that enable him to co-articulate the capacity to name and to evoke the three 
persons with the capacity to modulate his interactive stance on them. 
 
The social semiotic environment of the child in Halliday's account shows that many of the top-
down (level L+1) constraints do not derive from institutional norms, but from levels of social 
semiotic organisation in, for example, individuals families and interpersonal dynamics that are 
too fleeting to be recognised as institutions, but which are, in many ways, far more effective in 
giving rise to situations and their associated selection constraints in the form of the child's 
relations with particular persons, the affective and relational dynamics that play out, and the 
expectations that are formed. Emerging situation-types and re-alignments of these on L+1 
select for an expanded range of responses on Level L in the form of an increased repertoire of 
options for initiating and responding to the diverse forms of context-completion that arise. On 
Level L-1, body-brain dynamics are re-organised to yield persistent patterning. The self-
organising dynamic at work means that interactions between and feedback loops across levels 
give rise to repeated iterations of feedback loops that are attracted to, honed by, and converge 
on a particular outcome. For example, the desire to seek the absent father is a regular situation 
type on L+1 that feeds back across level and embodies their respective inputs so as to give rise 
to a persistent pattern in the form of the modulation of the name /dada/ with rising tone. That 
is, the desire to seek the absent father is attracted to a particular interaction outcome on level L 
that is embodied in persistent body-brain patterning on L-1. 
 
4. Languaging as Self-organising Activity: Internal to External Constraints 
 
The three persons are part of a non-linguistic social reality that afford the child occasions for 
interactive complexity that lead to the emergence of social realities that languaging operates 
on. The presence or absence of the three named persons on any given occasion are aspects of 
emergent social situations that utterances operate on and seek to modify. The child, through his 
utterances in Halliday's account, both operates on and transforms these social realities as well 
as further constituting them. The presence of absence of the three persons provides an 
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expanding range of possibilities for languaging that the child, in concert with the persons in his 
life, can interactively explore and develop together. 
Languaging is an (inter)action system for operating on social realities (Bickhard, 1987). The 
child's transition from infant proto-language to language shows that whereas many of the 
selection constraints in the proto-language derive from the local material context on which the 
child's utterances are dependent, the transition to the adult language system entails more and 
more layers of multiple and overlapping intrinsic functional constraints on what operations can 
be performed, when, in what order, and so on (Halliday, 1975, 1979; Martin, 1991). The 
possibilities for the child’s participating in structures of (linguistic) action and interaction are 
intrinsically constrained by the functional character of the action systems themselves, including 
language. 
In the first instance, many of the constraining and enabling factors that affect and modulate the 
child's proto-linguistic utterances exist in the internal and external material context such that 
the child's utterances seek to satisfy those constraints. With the transition from proto-language 
to language, the material context does not go away or cease to be relevant. Rather, the 
relationship is re-organised. More of context is built into languaging, meaning that more and 
more constraints become functional constraints that are intrinsic to the internal organisation of 
language itself. The emergence of 'lexicogrammar' is, then, the means by which the infant 
proto-language is re-organised as the adult language by virtue of the ways in which many of 
the external functional constraints necessary for the proto-language are now integrated to the 
newly emergent lexicogrammatical layer of organisation and re-organised as intrinsic 
functional constraints on languaging as (inter)action system. In this way, languaging becomes 
a fully-fledged context-completing, context-making, context-seeking mode of (inter)action. 
This view contrasts with the idea that the relationship between language form and meaning is 
arbitrary (e.g., Cattell, 2007/2000: 207; Saussure, 1917/1915: 100-102; Yule, 2006: 10), or that 
it is motivated by the sign-maker's interests (Kress, 1993). 
Languaging selves, like all living systems, are not passive systems that act only when acted on 
by internal or external causes. Languaging, like all human mental activity, goes on intrinsically 
in the central nervous system even when this 'inner' activity is not manifested as observable 
bodily activity. This internal activity is in the form of processes of microgenetic preparation 
and set up that maintain the person in a constant state of readiness for action in the world when 
required. Microgenetic processes are therefore functional in the ongoing recursive self-
maintenance of the person. In modulating the person's inner and outer activity, they prepare the 
person for interactivity with the external environment and maintain the person in a state of 
readiness. Microgenetic processes set up and constitute internal conditions and constraints on 
languaging (and other) activity. These processes maintain the brain's function stability and 
coherence. Even when there might appear to be no overt interaction with the external 
environment, person-environment or self-object transactions are constantly taking place as 
endophasic and exophasic activity. The brain does not 'represent' an independent external 
domain. The self-object or self-nonself duality and its co-articulation is primary and 
fundamental, not derivative. This means that the self does not exist without its object and the 
self's objects don't exist without the self. The two exist in a condition of constant co-articulated 
symbiosis. The infant is born with its virtual other and « associated companion space 
complementing her bodily self » (Bråten, 2013: 18) that, as Bråten explains, can be filled with 
actual others in relations of felt immediacy thereby enabling and sustaining the co-articulatory 
dialogic dance between self and its objects. Microgenesis goes on incessantly as background 
activity in the brain that keeps this dialogic dance going as the fundamental duality of mind 
process. 
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These internal conditions and constraints include affects, experiential memories, feelings, 
dispositions, desires, and values. External conditions include situational, social, and cultural 
factors. These conditions — internal and external — serve as constraints on and modulations 
of the dynamics of self-organising languaging activity. The four semiotic constraints outlined 
above constitute selection conditions that modulate emergent languaging activity. Languaging 
activity involves the striving for articulation in social situations of pre-linguistic, more global 
and less differentiated feeling-meaning. The self-organising character of this activity manifests 
implicit properties, tendencies, and capacities of the dynamics of the system that become more 
and more visible as formal arrangements and regularities as the system dynamics are expressed 
through multiple iterations and their concomitant production processes on the scale of an entire 
population of languaging selves in a given community. The concept of attractor in complex 
systems theory is thus used to express how these implicit properties and tendencies are 
manifested, over time, as emergent language forms and the functions they serve. Self-
organising languaging activity and its emergent 'formal' regularities are in accordance with 
both internal conditions that are set up by microgenetic processes and by external semiotic 
constraints of the kind outlined above. 
These constraints do not and cannot specify every fine-grained detail of utterances. Instead, the 
relationship between these general constraints and languaging activity is one of dialectical 
inter-penetration rather than the interaction of covariates or independent variables. Languaging 
is time-extended emergent activity in which the detail is filled in by specific selections from 
repertoires of options. Utterances have their microgenetic origins in more wholistic pre-
linguistic structures of feeling-meaning. These holistic structures constitute a more global, less 
articulated and less differentiated situation-utterance nexus that is progressively differentiated 
and articulated as an utterance in relation to its situation. 
Internal and external conditions and constraints dynamically inter-penetrate each other. 
Utterances are energised and animated from within by living persons as much as they are 
constrained by external factors. The utterances and other forms of action that derive from the 
inter-penetration of internal and external constraints and conditions orient to and seek to 
actualize these constraints in ways that are manifested in the formal organisation of emergent 
languaging (and other) activity. Unlike theories of the sign based on associationistic 
psychology, languaging is not a system for pairing forms with meanings. Languaging is a 
constraint-satisfying activity whereby languaging selves seek to orient to and to articulate the 
internal and external selection constraints and conditions in ways that are actualised in dynamic 
form-creating (morphogenetic) processes that give rise to emergent language form and 
function. 
 
5. Emergent Intrinsic Functional Constraints and Linguistic Patterning in an Utterance: 
Analysis of an Example 
 
In this section, I focus on the utterance as a unit of interaction rather than on formal units or 
abstracta such as the sentence. Halliday (1985) and Thompson & Couper-Kuhlen (2005: 485), 
working in the traditions of systemic-functional linguistics and Interactional Linguistics, 
respectively, have demonstrated that the clause is a locus of interaction. Halliday (1979) 
proposed an account of the intrinsic functional organisation of the clause in terms of four 
general semantic functions, or 'metafunctions', each with its distinctive mode of formal 
expression. Halliday’s term ‘metafunction’ designates four kinds of intrinsic functional 
organisation that are interwoven as distinct layers in the organisation of utterances. Each such 
layer makes a contribution to the meaning and organisation of the utterance as a whole. Table 
1 shows the four semantic metafunctions and provides information on the kind of functional 
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organisation they contribute to in the clause, their typical grammatical systems, and their mode 
of formal expression in the clause. 
 
Metafunction Type of Meaning Typical 
Grammatical 
Systems 
Mode of Expression 
Textual Clause anchored to situated 
locus of interaction 
Theme-Rheme Wave-like; periodic 







Experiential Clause as representation Transitivity; 
lexis 
Particulate; constituency 
Logical Dependency relations 







operand relations; 'thing' 
deixis in the nominal 
group and 'event' deixis in 
the clause 
 
 Table 1: Halliday's four semantic metafunctions in the clause 
 
In the analysis below, I show how in different yet complementary and overlapping ways the 
four metafunctions proposed by Halliday contribute to the clause as a locus of intrinsic 
functional interactive constraints and enablements on utterances. The clause is a locus of 
functional constraints and enablements that operates on unfolding phases or pulses of the flow 
of embodied first-order languaging and interactively constitutes them as dialogically organised 
loci of interaction. 
From the point of view of microgenetic theory, an utterance develops over a series of phasal 
transitions that reflect the hierarchic organisation of neuroanatomical structure (Brown, 2015; 
Tucker, 2002; Tucker et al, 2008). Rather than their activation by central brain processes, 
utterances (and other mental acts) have their origins in the deepest layers of pre-cortical brain 
organisation and are progressively developed upwards over various phases with their phasal 
transitions of brain activity. Successor phases are increasingly specified with respect to their 
antecedent phases until the endpoint of the process in the form of the phonetic or graphic 
actualization of an utterance. A spoken utterance arises with the elicitation of a series of 
rhythmic levels that begin with oscillators for the breath group and rhythmic timing and 
transition across the various phases of its microgenetic development to the fine-grained 
phonetic detail of the final utterance. Both microgenetic theory and Wundt's (1970/1900) 
account of the apperception of an initial relatively undifferentiated and more diffuse whole 
indicate that all mental acts — utterances included — have their intra-psychic origins in more 
global, less differentiated antecedent configurations. 
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Wundt's (1970/1900) concept of the Gesamtvorstellung captures this aspect of the derivation 
of an utterance. The Gesamtvorstellung is a vague, antecedent apprehension of a situation prior 
to its further specification as an articulated situation-utterance matrix. According to Wundt 
(1970/1900), an utterance begins with the apperception of a global or holistic representation 
(the Gesamtvorstellung). The Gesamtvorstellung is the simultaneous dimension of sentence 
structure. As Wundt’s theory of the sentence shows, apperception involves both the 
simultaneous and sequential aspects of sentence structure. Wundt explains the relation of the 
outer form of the utterance to the inner psychological factors which determine it as follows: 
 
The outer form is only the result of the process. It is, moreover, an end product which shows 
by its nature that the psychological factors determining a grammatical utterance are 
themselves distinct from the utterance. The sentence as an inner psychological construction 
must have a simultaneous quality in addition to the sequential one. Without this quality it 
could not be a coherent totality (Wundt, 1970/1900: 22). 
 
The « outer form » of the sentence, Wundt observes, is only the end product of psychological 
processes that determine the sentence structure. Like Brown’s microgenetic theory, the 
sentence is progressively elaborated through a series of phases before the final end product 
emerges as the actualised public utterance. 
This overall « cognitive configuration » (Wundt, 1970/1900: 22) is « formed into successive 
segments by the process of apperception » (Wundt, 1970/1900: 22). The differentiation of a 
particular aspect of the overall topology is, Wundt says, an act of judgment when the agent 
differentiates a particular feature rather than some other as the focus of attention. This feature 
is the psychological subject (Halliday, 2004/1985: 56; Wundt, 1970/1900: 24; cf. Halliday’s 
concept of 'theme' in the clause). The psychological subject picks out and differentiates that 
particular aspect of the experiential topology which the speaker apperceives as the starting 
point of the process of utterance construction or of utterance comprehension. Having selected 
and differentiated a particular feature of the overall topology, the agent comments on it or 
otherwise modifies it in some way. The initial differentiation is a holistic structure (Wundt’s 
Gesamtvorstellung) that is simultaneous. The Gesamtvorstellung is an antecedent 
configuration4 that precedes and anticipates the final linguistic structure.5  
The Gesamtvorstellung is a more global type of pre-linguistic organisation that is progressively 
differentiated until the terminal point of its actualization as the specific lexical exponents of a 
particular linguistic structure. Instead of saying that the clause is an assemblage of parts into a 
larger whole, the clause is a meta-grammatical formulation of a more global principle of 
linguistic-semantic organisation that can be lexically specified to a more delicate degree. Prior 
more holistic pre-linguistic wholes are not the causes of utterances. Rather, they are potentials 
of becoming (Brown, 2015: 104). The initial whole is therefore a virtual potential that can be 
unfolded along diverse trajectories of actualization. As the relatively undifferentiated 
antecedent whole differentiates into its component parts along the various transitional phases 
of its microgenetic trajectory, the parts that are specified at each phase of the trajectory 
                                                     
4 Brown (2005: 227) points out that evidence for the existence of antecedent configurations is shown by the way 
they “deposit prematurely as the symptoms of brain damage.” 
5 Wundt’s Gesamtvorstellung has also inspired McNeill’s idea of the Growth Point, seen as the initial impetus for 
the emergence of a speech-gesture complex that is unfolded out of the simultaneity of the initial Growth Point. 
McNeill argues that there is a dialectical relations between the initial Growth Point and the unfolding speech-
gesture complex because the nonlinear GP continues to shape the emerging speech-gesture complex (see McNeill 
and Duncan, 2000). 
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constitute further potentials of becoming. This helps to explain the relationship between 
'grammar' and 'lexis' in the clause. 
Let us consider the utterance, Chubby was eating on his stick, which was the opening utterance 
in a recount by my then twelve-year-old daughter a few moments after the incident in question. 
Chubby is a pet hamster. The stick is the hamster's chewing stick or food stick (Figure 2). Just 
prior to coming to my room to recount the event, my daughter had observed Chubby chewing 
on his food stick before accidentally rolling over and then regaining control. The event was 
sufficiently noteworthy at the time to prompt my daughter to recount what she had observed to 
me. For present purposes, I confine the discussion to her opening utterance. 
My daughter's utterance is a locus of interaction. The more general grammatical schema are 
potentials for further becoming that derive to the specific lexical categories are the 
microgenetic endpoint of the more general grammatical categories. Thus, a global transitivity 
structure such as Actor-Process: Action-Goal is a more general potential in which further 
possibilities of specification are immanent, e.g., Chubby (Actor) was eating (Process: Action) 
+ on his stick (Circumstance: Location). Of course, one can, analytically speaking, decompose 
the clause into its parts. My point, in line with the microgenetic account, is that the parts are 
derived from a prior whole and not the other way round. Having established the principle of 
whole-to-part derivation, rather than part-to-whole assembly, we can then see that the more 
global level analytically represented as the linguistic structure of the clause is in fact a resource 
for construing situations or aspects of situations that have been progressively differentiated and 
articulated as different facets of a prior, more global pre-utterance/situation matrix. On this 
view, the lexical items that instantiate specific categories of participants, processes, and 
circumstances in the clause are embedded in the prior apprehension of a global situation as the 
more natural way of experiencing them. 
Table 2 presents the multilayered functional organisation of the utterance, Chubby was eating 
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Function Clause as Locus of Interaction Potential 








Rheme: further specification of Theme, 
culminating in the clause-final salient item stick 
Mood: scopal-prosodic Subject Finite: Time Predicator               Adjunct 
 Mood                          Residue 

























Table 2: The utterance Chubby was eating on his stick, showing multi-layered intrinsic functional 
organisation of clause-level constraints and enablements 
 
The four semiotic constraints outlined above show that the intrinsic functional organisation of 
utterances integrates the different phases in the ontogenetic development of the child's 
languaging and the microgenetic traversal of an utterance-in-becoming across the various 
phases of its generation. Utterances integrate and re-organise to their own intrinsic functional 
principles of organisation the following phases in the microgenetic derivation of the utterance: 
 
1. The initial apprehension of an antecedent situation (cf. Wundt's Gesamtvorstellung) in 
the form of a holistic, relatively undifferentiated Self-Subject-Affect dynamic. My 
daughter apprehends a global, relatively undifferentiated situational matrix that prompts 
or provides the motive for a linguistically formulated I-stance: Chubby ^ affect dynamic 
^ me —> I-stance. It is noteworthy that she came to be in a state of great excitement 
immediately after the event in question. Clearly, what she saw had affected her to the 
point where she wanted to tell me about it. Affect is important both in relation to her 
initial perception and in relation to her utterance though it does not follow that the same 
affect necessarily prompted both. Over many years, researchers in microgenetic theory 
(Brown, 1979, 1988; Rosenthal, 2004; Sander, 1930; Visetti, 2004; Werner, 1957/1940;), 
in psychoanalytical theory (Ehrenzweig, 1965; Schilder, 1951a, 1951b; Varendonck, 
1921) and in neurobiology (Brown, 2015; Damasio, 1999, 2010; Hart, 2008/2006; 
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Trevarthen, 1979, 2009; Tucker, 2002) have shown that affects are the stimulators of 
perception, memory, utterances, and other mental acts)6. 
 
2. The elicitation of a series of rhythmic periodicities synchronizes the self's attention to 
some particular feature of the situation that serves as an initial focus of attention and thus 
as the starting point for the process of utterance construction. The perception of temporal 
pattern enables the self to attune to and synchronize with pulses of rhythmically 
organised space-time. Peaks in this rhythmic, wave-like movement foreground the 
informational salience of items whereas troughs recede into the background. Catherine's 
utterance both arouses attention and focuses it on a specific aspect of the experiential 
topology that is thematised or made salient by the initial peak of rhythmic activity. Given 
that it is the initial utterance in her recount, this initial focus moves the two of us to 
converge on a particular location in the topology that her utterance evokes. The rhythmic 
peak that establishes the initial focus is a « basin of attraction » that serves to change 
brain dynamics from one basin to another in order to redirect attention and awareness. I 
was working on my computer when Catherine came to my room to recount what had 
happened to Chubby and the food stick. Her utterance thus serves to move us both into 
that "basin" and to sustain and further modulate that focus over the duration of her 
recount. The Gesamtvorstellung is thus apperceptively segmented into two basic 
components: (1) the psychological subject as the initial anchor point in the situation for 
the development of an utterance about it; and (2) the further transformation of the 
psychological subject in the form of an incipient stance on or interactive orientation 
towards it. These two components correspond to two peaks of prominence of an 
oscillatory rhythmic wave that prepares for an anticipates the co-synchronization of 
addressor and addressee to these two rhythmically salient aspects of the situation. In the 
clause, this antecedent configuration is specified as the Theme — Rheme structure of the 
clause. This rhythmic structure thus serves to co-synchronize to an emerging figure (the 
utterance-in-becoming) that is progressively set off against a situational ground with 
which it is co-articulated in increasingly more differentiated ways. This begins a process 
of entextualization that differentiates and yet co-articulates utterance and situation. The 
periodic synchronization of the clause as a wave-like flow consisting of two peaks of 
prominence that anchors the utterance to a selected feature of the local context (Theme) 
that is indicated as the current locus of concern and it so doing this periodic flow 
synchronizes participants to salient features of the flow and its further development in 
the utterance (Rheme). In this way, the utterance thematizes a stable anchor point in the 
                                                     
6 The relationship between the self and its objects is not then one of ‘representations’ that mediate between the 
inner world of the self, defined as a fixed entity or substance, and the outer world of the self’s objects. The self 
has both endophasic (internal) and exophasic (external) aspects that develop in parallel with the self’s objects. 
Microgenetic theory shows that the subject pole of the subject-object relation generates the object pole. The two 
poles are co-articulated aspects of a single derivational process. Wordings and other mental objects can also enact 
dream imagery, mental verbal and visual imagery, recollections, etc. that are part of self and thus remain ‘inner’ 
or covert aspects of endophasia (Bergounioux, 2001, 2010; Bottineau, 2012). On the other hand, world-side 
objects detach from a self in the final phases of microgenetic construction as they are adaptively pruned by 
incoming stimulus information and sculpted as perception of a world-side object (Deacon, 1989). In this sense, 
world-side objects as they appear in perception are adaptive models of things that the self attends to in the flow 
of its mental life — including its languaging (see Thibault, 2017). The two poles—self and its objects — are co-
articulated aspects of a microgenetic derivational process. They are generated by both endophasic and exophasic 
aspects of microgenetic construction. 
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situation so that participants can co-synchronize the synchronization of utterance and 
situation to that aspect of the situation that the utterances requires them to attend to. 
 
3. The synchronization of the agent to these kinetic rhythms induces a « change in arousal 
» (Deacon, 2005: 275; see above) that the initial apprehension of the situation sets up at 
a very early stage in the neurological derivation of an utterance. This gives rise to a pre-
mood interactive field of relations and affects together with the motivation and arousal 
to orient to a particular interactive stance within that pre-mood frame. In the structure of 
the clause, this initial intensive modalised field of affect is organised in terms of the 
scopal-prosodic character of the clause as a locus of interpersonal interaction (McGregor, 
1997: 64-70). The speaker takes up a specific interactive stance in relation to the entity 
— Chubby — in which the speaker invests the modal success of the incipient utterance. 
For example, the mood operator in the clause holds the entire clause and modifies its 
grammatical shape to indicate its interactive status and thus to indicate an interactive 
stance on it. The selection of declarative mood thus selects Chubby as the Subject in 
which the speaker modally invests by taking up an interactive stance in relation to the 
Subject. 
 
4. The initial segmentation of the incipient situation described in (2) above is further 
differentiated by the analysis of the situation as a configuration of functionally diverse 
roles and the relations between them. The functional diversity of semantic roles 
(participants, process) that is manifested in the transitivity structure of the clause 
constitutes a unity and derives from a more diffuse, more global precursor unity -- a more 
holistic apprehension of an incipient situation -- that constitutes the commonality of 
origin of the diverse parts or roles that are actualised in the derivational process as 
particular lexical selections. In the final product, the particulate or constituency relations 
in the clause analyse the different components of a situation into a configuration of 
functional role relations. These roles are not, however, disparate parts that are assembled 
to form a whole, but parts that derive from a prior whole that is specified into its parts. 
Persons activate and tap into that prior unity and the experiences that it evokes. In the 
example, this loose configuration of functional roles can be specified as CHUBBY + 
ACTION: EAT + STICK. 
 
5. The loose configuration of functional roles in (4) are related to each other and to the 
emerging situation in more specific ways by the dependency relations in and beyond the 
clause that specify the relationships between the functional roles in the clause, their 
relations to the situation, and to other utterances. For present purposes, I confine the 
discussion to dependency relations within the utterance at the level of the clause. 
Dependency relations consist of operators and the arguments that operators operate on 
and recursively modify in some way. In the verbal group, the Finite operator TIME: PAST 
operates on the process EAT to ground Chubby's action in the past. Moreover, the 
prepositional phrase on his stick is a circumstantial operator that operates on its argument 
Chubby was eating. This argument describes a situation. The Circumstance is a constraint 
that circumscribes the action described by locating it in relation to the food stick. The 
entire utterance is itself an operator that operates on a prior situation that my daughter 
witnessed and which she then evokes for me in her recount about it. 
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Figure 2: Five phases in the microgenetic transition from the initial relatively undifferentiated focus on 




Reading from top to bottom, Figure 2 re-constructs the progression from the initial 
apperception of the incipient antecedent configuration — c.f. Wundt's Gesamtvorstellung — 
through the five phases in the microgenetic transition from the initial relatively undifferentiated 
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focus on the situation through the various phases in the increased differentiation-articulation of 
the utterance-situation matrix, as follows: 
1. The initial incipient situational configuration: Chubby affects Catherine and prompts an I-
stance  in relation to her ‘me’. In this initial phase, there is awareness of emotion and value 
and incipient awareness of experiential content. 
2. The apperception of and synchronization to rhythmic oscillators that thematize Chubby as  
the situationally anchored starting point of the utterance as the focus of attention . The Praat 
analysis shows that the rhythmic periodicity establishes two peaks of prominence focusing on 
CHUBBY and STICK, respectively. CHUBBY is thus established as the situational anchor for the 
development of an utterance about him. In this phase, the rhythmic pattern organises multiple 
and competing primary percepts into an overall Gestalt that is anchored in time and place. 
3. The speaker's scoping of a declarative stance on the utterance-in-becoming in which the 
proto-declarative mood operator holds the incipient utterance in its scope and shapes it to 
indicate the speaker’s interactive stance on it. In this phase, an orientation to a still incipient 
overall meaning begins to be shaped for interactive ends. 
4. The initial segmentation of the utterance into a configuration of not-yet-lexicalised 
functional role relations. The overall meaning-shape referred to in 3. begins to be shaped by 
the environment that the utterance-in-becoming strives to co-articulate with, in the process 
providing a higher degree of specification of the situation model prior to lexical specification 
as the trajectory of the incipient utterance leans more into its situation.  
5. The specifying of the dependency relations showing the recursive modification of arguments 
by their operators. Operator-argument dependency relations impose a partial ordering on the 
utterance-in-becoming that enables the final order of the lexical selections to be specified. 
As Table 2 shows, all of the above factors leave their trace in the final utterance as diverse 
modes of overlapping and multi-layered intrinsic functional organisation. The transition across 
phases 1 to 5 shows the filling in of more of the detail as the utterance-in-becoming transitions 
across the diverse phases of its microgenetic development, with earlier phases being integrated 
to and re-organised by later ones. Thus, the initial configuration in 1. is integrated to an 
oscillatory rhythmic pattern that establishes a situational anchor point in 2. This rhythmic 
oscillator is in turn integrated to the prosodic-scopal shaping of the pre-mood orientation of the 
utterance-in-becoming in 3. In 4, the utterance-in-becoming is chunked into the diverse 
functional roles that will become its transitivity structure. In 5, the recursive operation of 
dependency relations specifies the relations of inter-dependency between different components 
of the increasingly differentiated-articulated utterance-in-becoming thus allowing content lexis 
and functional lexis to be filled in. 
Instead of saying that the clause is an assemblage of parts into a larger whole, the clause is a 
meta-grammatical formulation of a more global principle of linguistic-semantic organisation 
that can be lexically specified to a more delicate degree. Each phase from 1. to 5. above in the 
corporeal schematization of the utterance that I have re-constructed above shows how different 
functional parameters, starting with more holistic rhythmic oscillators and the prosodic-scopal 
shaping of an interactive orientation to a situation and ending with more fine-grained 
differentiations such as participant roles and the relations between them, are phases in a 
continuous space of microgenetic construction of the utterance-in-becoming. Each phase is a 
progressive honing and parametrization of the shape of the final utterance. Each phase is a 
potential from which the successor phases emerge that influences the further development of 
the microgenetic construction process. As Table 2 shows, the different phasal contributions to 
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the final utterance are evident in the layered blending of different and overlapping modes of 
functional organisation that contribute to the organisation of the final utterance. 
Of course, one can, analytically speaking, decompose the clause into its parts. My point, in line 
with the microgenetic account, is that the parts are derived from the whole, and not the other 
way round. The microgenetic construction of an utterance is a highly textured configurational 
pattern of brain activity that draws on affect, feeling, imagination, memory, and value in order 
to model an utterance that yields hypotheses and anticipations that are tested in the dialogical 
space of arguability in which interactive stances can be tested, corrected, refined, and changed 
(Halliday, 2004/1985: 110; Thibault, 2005a, b, 2012). For example, Declarative and 
interrogative mood assert or question propositions, in contrast to imperatives, which are 
proposals for action. Propositions can be argued about from different points of view. They can 
be affirmed, denied, agreed with, doubted, contradicted, supported, and so on, by other persons 
in their dialogical uptake of them. Persons are not all knowing. They are deictically anchored 
to a body and to the viewpoints that their embodiment enables. In their languaging, persons 
continually probe and test their environments, seeking responses from others. Moreover, their 
own languaging activity also continually changes their environment by assimilating to others' 
languaging and by enacting coherent actions that affect the environment, including other 
persons.  
 
6. Utterances as Movement, Growth, and Becoming: Moving Along Together 
 
An utterance is a dynamic corporeal schematization (section 1) that enables or seeks the co-
articulation of the self with the particular aspect of the world that is indicated and activated in 
the local experiential topology by the utterance. The corporeal schematization of an utterance 
is an operation on the interaction flow at the same time that the utterance is the movement in 
time of an action trajectory. Rather than static structures, utterances are organisations of process 
that are constrained and scaffolded by intrinsic functional constraints that provide indications 
to participants as to how to move in time with the flow of the utterance, to follow its indications, 
and to attend to them. Linguists have often reduced utterances to static abstract structure, 
dissected their component parts, and proposed often arcane rules of combination to explain 
how the supposed parts of utterances were put together to form the whole. Consequently, the 
life was removed from living languaging. 
Deleuze and Guattari (2004/1980) proposed the idea of « lines of flight » to show that we 
extend into the world trajectories of movement and becoming that get intertwined with and 
entangled with other's lines of flight. Ingold (2016) uses the idea of the knot to illustrate how 
the diverse lifelines that people extend into the world becomes meshed with those of others to 
form sometimes very dense and thick interpenetrations of peoples' lifelines. Ingold (2016) has 
used the term correspondence in relation to the ways we move along with each other and with 
other beings and objects in the world we live in. Adelbert Ames Jr. (1955) also writes about 
‘correspondence’ in ways that are similar to Ingold’s notion when formulating the relationship 
between stimulus pattern, environmental situation, and the personal contribution of the 
perceiver in explaining the perceiver’s awareness of the environment. In their languaging, 
people lay down pathways along which they move, taking others with them (Thibault, 2021 a, 
b). Figure 3 and related discussion show how Catherine's utterance is a flow of verbally 
modulated whole-body sense-making activity that I have analysed into three micro-phases.  
 





       Chubby  was                            eat             ing                    on                his      st-                                     
-ick 
        Phase 1                                                       Phase 2                                 Phase 3 
 
Figure 3: The three micro-phases of the utterance Chubby was eating on his stick 
 
The three micro-phases of the utterance shown in Figure 3 are as follows: 
 
Phase 1 (0.364030 s): The pitch (blue line) rises markedly from a low of 276.5 Hz to a 
high of 429.9 Hz, encompassing the segment Chubby was. There is a marked surge of 
intensity (green line). Catherine's eye gaze and body posture are adjusted to focus on one 
of the books lying on the bed. She reaches for one of the books and grasps it. 
 
Phase 2 (0.774069 s): The pitch movement ranges from an initial 262.8 Hz and falls to 
124.3 Hz and is held fairly steadily around this value for the duration of this phase, which 
extends over the segment eating on. Catherine begins to lift the book in her hand. Her 
eye gaze and body posture continue to be directed to the book she has in her hand until 
his, when she adjusts her body posture and eye gaze to attend to me. 
 
Phase 3 (0.667851): The pitch moves from 259.6 Hz to 246.7 Hz on his and moves from 
141.2 Hz to 251.3 Hz on the final syllable of stick. There is a surge of intensity on this 
syllable. Noteworthy is the lengthening of the onset consonant cluster, /ST/, which 
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extends for 0.300265 s. Catherine continues to lift the book with her two hands while 
looking at me. 
 
The three phases of the actualized utterance unfold from a prior virtual simultaneity that is 
present in the pre-linguistic infrastructure. The serial order of utterances derives from prior, 
implicit relatively undifferentiated meaningful wholes that enable utterances to be apprehended 
as having a simultaneous and a global organisation that exists prior to their enactment as 
serially ordered utterances that unfold in time. Utterances transition over a single mental epoch 
from the unconscious simultaneity and spatiality of their beginning phases to the seriality and 
temporal order of the conscious end phases of their microgenetic derivation. The earlier phases 
are not the causal inputs to the later ones, seen as the outputs (effects) of the earlier ones; rather, 
all phases are embedded in the final endpoint of the derivation and actualize together on 
completion of the end-phase (Brown, 2010: 14-15). The endpoint — the completed utterance 
— is a cycle of phases from earlier to later that constitute one epoch. 
The utterance analysed in Figure 3 is the time-extended laying down of a pathway of 
exploration and discovery — a line of flight (Guattari, 2016/2011) — that Catherine and I move 
along together as Catherine begins the process of developing her recount of Chubby and the 
food stick. Her utterance is the further development in the serial time of the utterance of this 
latent potential. In following this movement, Catherine and I, from our respective viewpoints, 
attend to different facets of the development of the movement trajectory that the utterance 
unfolds. In the subsequent development of her recount, the book she takes hold of becomes 
Chubby's food stick as she evokes what she had witnessed only moments earlier in another 
room before coming to me to tell me about it. The utterance is embedded in a larger matrix of 
bodily mimetic activities. Indeed, it is more accurate to say that her utterance, these mimetic 
activities, and the book she takes hold of are all co-synchronized aspects of a single line of 
movement and becoming — a line of flight — that we explore together. 
Utterances are structures of action involving differentiated role relations such as Actor and 
Goal or Agent and Patient in the transitivity structure of the clause. In these models, action and 
passion are the same thing. As Fabbri (1998: 41) points out, the action performed by the agent 
affects the patient such that the passion is the point of view of the person who is affected by 
and transformed by an action. Werner and Kaplan's account of the 'corporeal schematization' 
that takes place in the co-articulation of self and its objects further shows that whereas linguists 
have tended to consider the utterance to be a 'linguistic' object of study in its own right, the 
structure of action and passion also includes the person who performs the action and those who 
are affected by it (Thibault, 2002). In this sense, Catherine's utterance is necessarily embedded 
in a larger action structure, as set out below: 
 
SELF1: Catherine: Agent: 
Addressor: I 
Action Performed: her utterance: 
Chubby was eating on his stick 
SELF2: me: Affected: 
Addressee: you 
MODALISING AGENT MODALISING LINGUISTIC ACTION MODALISED AGENT 
 
Table 3: The utterance Chubby was eating on his stick embedded in larger structure of action 
 
Table 3 shows that the utterance is an action that is performed by a self to affect another self in 
ways that are anchored to a situation. One self seeks to move the other self. The structure of 
the action is not the utterance per se, but also includes the two selves who enact it and are 
affected by it, respectively. Seen in this light, the intrinsic functional organisation of the 
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utterance serves to establish the orientational framework that stabilizes a dialogically 
coordinated interactional focus. In breve, the utterance (1) thematizes an interactional focus; 
(2) the Subject of the clause instantiates and grounds the utterance in terms of Person deixis in 
which the speaker invests a modalised interactive stance. This stance is attached to first person 
speaker addressor or second person addressee, who are interactive participants in the 
dialogically coordinated array of I/you, or to a non-participating third person participant to 
which addressor and addressee can co-orient; (3) the differentiation of participant roles and 
their relations specifies a situation image or referent situation that can be continuously updated; 
and (4) thing deixis in the nominal group and event deixis in the clause recursively operate on 
and specify to varying degrees of definiteness/indefiniteness and actuality/non-actuality the 
referent situation and its participant roles with reference to the viewpoints of the addressor and 
addressee. 
The wording Chubby was eating on his stick constitutes the higher-order constraints on her 
whole-body-sense-making activity, not just the vocal part. Catherine modulates her body along 
the task-specific functionally organised lines specified by the lexicogrammatical order 
parameters in the clause to produce a co-articulated bodily action that links her both to aspects 
of the immediate situation in which we are co-present at the same time that she evokes in the 
present what she had witnessed Chubby do just moments earlier. Indirect evidence for this prior 
whole lies in the fact that, at the onset of her utterance, Catherine reaches out to grasp the book-
cum-stick, which is not mentioned until the final part of the utterance. Whereas the verbal 
aspect thematises Chubby in the onset phase, her hand action shows the anticipation and 
development of another aspect of the overall idea, which is made prominent in the final stage 
of the utterance. In other words, her vocalisation, shifts in eye gaze and body posture, and hand 
action attend to different loci of concern and unfold them as the time-extended development of 
different aspects of the prior simultaneity that was present in the prior Gesamtvorstellung that 
was initially formed in response to the scene she witnessed. 
The utterance is then a further development and elaboration of that initial complex of affect, 
feeling, and imagery. However, utterances, while originating in these antecedent 
configurations, are their further differentiation and articulation. Werner and Kaplan propose 
four different yet inter-related generic components of the situation in which symbolic activity 
occurs. The four components of the orthogenetic principle are four parameters along which 
increasing distancing and differentiation occur (Werner and Kaplan, 1984/1963: 44-51). The 
four components are as follows: (1) between person and object; (2) between person and sign 
vehicle; (3) between symbolic vehicle and referential object; and (4) between addressor and 
addressee. 
According to Werner and Kaplan, the developmental changes brought about by the increasing 
distance in symbol-situations in the life of the child take the form of "increasing differentiation 
of the components of symbol-situations and of increasing integrative systematization 
(autonomization) of symbolic forms." (1984/1963: 40), in accordance with what Werner and 
Kaplan term the 'orthogenetic principle.' Werner and Kaplan (1984/1963: chap. 3) present the 
notion of the "orthogenetic principle" in order to explain both (1) the increasing articulation 
and differentiation of symbolic forms; and (2) their increasing integrative systematization (see 
Werner & Kaplan, 1984/1963: 40). 
The antecedent configuration mentioned above is a covert organismic schema. Werner and 
Kaplan (1984/1963: 48) refer to this as the « inner form » of the sign vehicle as distinct from 
the « outer form » that is manifested in concrete utterances. In the current example, Catherine's 
mimetic bodily activities are the concrete external manifestation of aspects of the inner form 
of her utterance. The vocal utterance, on the other hand, manifests increased distance and hence 
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increased differentiation and articulation though it too is not entirely separated from the covert 
organismic schema from which it derives. 
With some adjustments, the four components of Werner and Kaplan's account of distancing 
can be assimilated to the account of the multilayered intrinsic functional organisation of 
utterances outlined above. It is this organisation which enables utterances to co-articulate selves 
to selected aspects of their worlds, including other selves. 
First, the thematisation of Chubby as the locus of an incipient utterance is a rhythmic 
periodicity that shapes consciousness of the situation relative to the embodied point of view of 
the self by anchoring that point of view to a rhythmic pulse of salience in relation to which the 
self and its point of view is coordinated (Thibault, 2004: 57) (Figure 3). The increasing distance 
between persons and objects means that self and its objects are no longer fused as holistic 
affective — sensory-motor patterns (Werner and Kaplan, 1984/1963: 44) as in infancy. At later 
development stages, a functional shift occurs that enables objects to be perceived as existing in 
the world beyond the self. When this occurs, objects are perceived for their functional 
capacities — their affordances — for action at the same time that the object and the self's 
relation to it can now be assimilated to internal sensory-kinetic schema and models for 
operating on, manipulating and thinking about the objects in the world beyond the self. 
Secondly, the increasing distance of Catherine from the utterance and related mimetic activity 
means that these are partially lifted from the flow of activity and reified as sign vehicles that 
stand out against and are partially distinguished from the flow. They therefore assume greater 
salience as does a figure in relation to its ground. The utterance and related mimetic activity 
therefore draw attention to themselves as being distinct from yet related to their surrounds in 
ways that are significant. Utterance and mimetic activity are said to be entextualised in this 
sense (Urban, 1996). They assume an artefactual status that makes them stand out from their 
surrounds. An artefact is an organisation of material processes that arises in and through human 
activity at the same time that it is embedded in and is used in human activity. Artefacts are 
material products of human agency that exist independently of social practices but can be used 
and interpreted in them. Artefacts have structures of information and potential ways of 
operating them that are built into their material organisation and which can be used and 
interpreted in human activities and practices. Utterances are also actions. They are first-order 
bodily actions produced by the vocal tract and related bodily movements that are constrained 
and enabled by second-order linguistic pattern. In this sense, a spoken utterance is a gesture-
sound-wording complex. Second-order linguistic pattern is detectable in utterances as patterns 
of words and wordings (Thibault, 2011a). 
Thirdly, the increasing distance between utterance and referent situation is manifested in the 
fact that these activities occur after the observed episode is concluded. The utterance uses a 
conventional grammatical schema. However, this schema retains aspects of its concrete origins. 
The book is integrated to the mimetic activity and becomes Chubby's food stick, which Chubby 
grasps with his front paws while chewing on it. The activity described by the schema is a 
concrete activity that iconically resembles the observed activity. The transitivity structure of 
the clause analyses the perceived event in terms of a number of separate components -- Chubby, 
the action of eating, the food stick -- that bear an iconic resemblance to the different 
components of the perceived event. The proper noun Chubby indicates specific properties of 
the well-fed hamster. The noun stick specifies a particular kind of object that has properties 
and affordance potentials that make it suitable for grasping and manipulating by means of the 
hand or paw. 
Fourthly, the increasing differentiation of addressor and addressee is a selection pressure that 
enables the self to participate in an increasingly diverse heteroglossic field consisting of other 
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selves with their diverse often conflicting stances. In encountering these differences and the 
semiotic-modal friction that they generate, the self is motivated to develop increasingly 
autonomous stances in a relational field of other selves and their stances. This provides the 
incentive for the child to transition from his or her proto-language to the languaging practices 
of the community of languaging selves in which the infant participates. To do so, the child 
increasingly draws on and dialogically appropriates the community resources in order to 
participate in the dialogically coordinated interactive stance-taking that is entailed in 
languaging activity. 
Fifthly, the emergence of languaging from the antecedent forms of the infant proto-language 
involves a trade-off between the subjective microgenetic origins of utterances in intra-psychic 
process and the requirement to orient to social and cultural norms and values that languaging 
entails. Languaging is a communal resource that has been fashioned over many generations by 
many different persons. It is a kind of semiotic-cognitive commons (Tallis, 2020) that all can 
contribute to and that all must draw on, appropriate and transform in their dialogically 
coordinated languaging with others. The communal-historical dimension of languaging means 
that it exists in an impersonal domain on the population scale that allows for historical depth 
through the recursive construction and modification of one's own and others' utterances. 
Languaging becomes increasingly detached from and independent of individual selves in ways 
that make is increasingly able to be recursively acted on and modified by more languaging by 
other selves. Thus, one word (red) can recursively operate on and modify another word, wine, 
to yield the nominal group red wine. The adjectival operator operates on its nominal argument 
in two ways. First, it gives rise to a new construction resulting from the combination of the two 
terms. Secondly, the recursive application of the operator on its argument modifies the meaning 
of the latter term. 
I call these two possibilities recursive construction and meta-recursive modification, 
respectively. Recursive construction and meta-recursive modification give rise to new 
operator-argument relations and restrictions on the probability of co-occurrence of both words 
and things in the world and words and word classes. Languaging recursively operates on the 
world and on itself. These recursive operations have historical depth that yield consensual 
domains when collective usage patterns with their co-occurrence restrictions enable the 
dialogical coordination of persons, their viewpoints, understandings, perceptions, and so on. 
Utterances are forms of action that recursively operate on the particular aspect of the 
experiential topology that they point to and indicate in particular situations as the currently 
active aspect. Consensus is achieved by these recursive operations, not by the encoding, 
transmission, and decoding of thoughts or ideas between persons (Kravchenko, 2003; 
Maturana, 1970). 
As I pointed out above, these recursive operations and the dependency relations that they give 
rise to both within utterances and between utterances and the contexts that are apperceived to 
be in operation are local in character and are therefore presupposed to be locally accessible by 
the participants in the interaction. Given the very rapid time scales of the order of several 
hundred milliseconds of brain activity in the case of the microgenetic derivation of an utterance, 
the historical depth of this recursivity is critically important. In this way, a lot of interaction 
history is embedded in the organism thereby enabling the feedback loops across a relatively 
small number of neuroanatomical and bodily levels to embody the relevant higher-level 
semiotic constraints on languaging activity. If this were not the case, it is difficult to see how 
the tiny time scales involved in microgenesis could allow for significant and persisting inputs 
from higher-scaler levels of social semiotic organisation. 
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The five parameters outlined above specify five ways in which the intrinsic functional 
organisation of utterances enables them to co-articulate diverse functional components, 
including persons, their utterances and other actions, artefacts and tools of many kinds, aspects 
of situations, and so on, into larger-scale assemblages. Bodies have the capacity to form 
functional assemblages with other bodies. In other words, bodies have the capacity to form 
functional structures with other bodies — human and nonhuman, animate and inanimate — 
while maintaining the heterogeneity of the component parts of the assemblage. Utterances 
have, in varying ways, the capacity to co-articulate and to affect the bodies that comprise a 
socio-cognitive-affective assemblage. I derive the term “assemblage” from the work of 
Deleuze (2004/1968) and Deleuze and Guattari (2004/1980). Deleuze and Guattari define 
affect as a body’s capacity to act and to be acted upon. Utterances are operations on situations 
that can catalyse particular social effects in a given assemblage when the right conditions 
prevail. These effects are activated when thresholds, i.e., critical points or singularities, are 
crossed. In the example, Catherine's utterance indicates Chubby as the specific locus of concern 
in the process of activating and modulating a flow of activity, attention, and awareness that 
enables us to move along together in the process of exploration and discovery that her utterance 
activates. 
An assemblage functions both to enable and to constrain its interacting components. An 
assemblage can be parametrized, following Deleuze (2004/1968) and De Landa (2010: 12-13), 
along two main dimensions. The first parameter is the degree of territorialisation and/or 
deterritorialization, which can refer to the spatial boundaries of a whole. It can also refer to the 
extent to which the assemblage homogenises its component parts. In the episode analysed 
above, the utterance serves to co-orient the two persons, their spatial positioning relative to 
each other in the room, and the book-cum-stick in the formation of a larger-scale assemblage 
in which the components of the assemblage are homogenised to the extent necessary to 
'territorialise' the interaction and thus to mark it off from its surroundings. 
The second parameter is the degree of codification and decodification. Codification refers to 
the role played by languaging in fixing the identity of a social whole, e.g., a community, nation 
state, a dialogue between persons, a shared inter-world, and so on (De Landa, 2010: 13). The 
two participants orient to linguistic and other norms that work to fix (codify) the identity of the 
whole. In Catherine's home, a number of languages somewhat fluidly work to codify the social 
identities of the different relationships and associated practices and affective commitments. 
Catherine, Chubby, and I share an interworld. Our languaging plays an important role in the 
fixing of the identity of that interworld. 
Selves extend into and are entangled with many aspects of the « interworlds » (Linell, 2009: 
160) that connect them to other selves and to the meshwork of the extended human ecology 
over diverse places and times. By the same token, these interworlds and the selves who live in 
them constitute what Ingold (2013: 11) calls a « zone of interpenetration ». Selves incorporate 
their interworlds just as the interworlds that form the common ground of selves are entangled 
with the neurohormonal and bodily dynamics of selves (Stuart & Thibault, 2015). Linell’s idea 
of the interworld shows that the actions, feelings, perceptions, thoughts, and utterances of 
selves are relational phenomena that are always in some way entangled with aspects of the life 
trajectories of selves and their entanglements with other selves and with the affordances, 
artefacts, institutions, and technologies of the extended human ecology. 
In their zones of interpenetration, selves engage in dialogically coordinated languaging. The 
dialogical nature of this activity means that there is a symbiosis of two or more interacting 
systems. When two or more selves interact in this way, their internal and external dynamics 
interpenetrate and are entangled. Their respective actions are no longer causally independent. 
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We cannot pose why questions about the one without also posing them about the other. The 
dialogical coordination of selves constitutes a new system with its own behaviours, its own 
processes, its own identity, and its own environment. The dialogical coordinations that 
recursive languaging enables between persons take the form of constraints and enablements 
that leave their trace in the formal organisation of languaging. 
A dialogically coordinated system of two or more interacting selves constrains the reciprocal 
behaviours of all parties. In contrast to the prevailing view that decomposing a dialogical 
system into its subsystems and analytical parts to yield a de-contextualized collection of 
analytical units that reductionism requires, it is necessary to view the higher-order, context-
dependent dialogical system as the source of the system's capacity to change its identity in 
contrast to environmental factors that merely change behaviour. Selves and their identities are 
dependent on higher-order context-dependent system relations that are irreducible to their 
decomposition into analytical parts and subprocesses. The co-articulation of self-object 
relations gives rise to the dialogical coordination of self-systems and their environment. 
The transition from infant proto-language to the communal language (or languages) is an 
adaptive transition that is invested in the social survival of the infant qua developing self. The 
social semiotic environment of the infant does not simply affect or change behaviour. Instead, 
it is an environment of a kind that can change system identity. This involves the kinds of 
interactions between scalar levels that I discussed in section 3. The emergence of the 
languaging self is a change of system identity of this kind. The self emerges in dyads of caring 
in which the actions of the two participants, e.g., mother and infant, enhance each other's 
survival and fitness. The dyad is a symbiosis of the infant and parent systems. As I showed in 
section 3, the reorganisation of the higher scalar social semiotic environment requires the child 
to adapt the initial three-person interaction system described by Halliday to the new 
requirement to take up more diverse modal stances on changing environmental conditions. 
This requirement forces changes that are more than a simple expansion of a behavioural 
repertoire. Instead, the changes make the system's identity — the child's identity — dependent 
on the changing social semiotic environment and the changing demands that it makes on the 
child. The child adapts by transitioning to the communal language and thus the ability to 
participate in an expanding diversity of interactive-stance taking as a criterion for membership 
in the community. The emergence of the languaging self therefore involves interactions 
between behaviours, languaging included, and identity through the mediating effects of the 
environments that exert selection constraints on the self. Thus, the ability to participate in the 
heteroglossia of contrasting intentions, viewpoints, values, and motives selects for the 
languaging self. The self is drawn into the attractor landscape of languaging as a final causation 
that is inherent in adaptation. 
Moreover, the emergence of selfhood just is adaptive. The ability to participate cooperatively 
in a society of selves, in contrast to the ideologically prevalent but destructive doctrine of the 
self-interested neoliberal self, means that the self is a new kind of being who is adapted to take 
advantage of the dialogical cooperation that a society of selves enables and requires. A society 
of selves has capacities that individuals don't have. These capacities create the conditions that 
favour the long-term survival of all members rather than of the individual per se. This entails 
changes on all levels of the scalar hierarchy that I discussed in section 4. With respect to the 
proto-linguistic infant, the languaging self is a new kind of social being, with new identities, 
new body-brain patterns, and new agentive capacities which could never emerge except 
through one's active and responsive dialogical participation in a society of selves. 
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7. Languaging is Self-organising Constraint-satisfying Activity: Endogenous and 
Exogenous Factors 
 
Catherine's utterance is more than just the vocal dimension. It is a whole-body movement of 
sense-making activity that we attend to and follow together along the various phases of its 
development. Catherine's utterance is a living line of movement and becoming. Catherine has 
just come to me from the room where Chubby is kept. I am in my study at work on my 
computer. She sits on the bed where a number of books have been placed. She faces me while 
she speaks. We attune to each other through mutual eye gaze, body posture, and other factors. 
I record the episode with my mobile phone. As the analysis in Figure 3 shows, the micro-
temporal development of the utterance as a flow of movement features a rising pitch contour 
over the segment Chubby was. Catherine's eye gaze is directed at one of the books lying beside 
her on the bed. She reaches out to grasp one of them. 
The lexicogrammatical patterns that we perceive as wordings in utterances are high-order 
global constraints that specify a pattern of parameters within which the body-brain dynamics 
of languaging agents are co-articulated. Lexicogrammatical order parameters constrain and 
bias action, awareness, feeling, and perception. They are attractors, i.e., implicit system 
properties that are manifested as patterns of wordings as the system dynamics are, over time, 
expressed through multiple iterations of languaging activity in a given population of 
languaging agents. 
For example, the wording orthographically transcribed as Chubby was eating on his stick 
dialogically shapes and coordinates the bodies of the two participants —my daughter and 
myself — into a joint act of moving along in time with the utterance, attending to its unfolding 
affordance layouts, and interactively exploring these. In this way, participants modulate and 
shape their bodies in task-specific, functionally defined, dialogically coordinated, special 
purpose, linguistically constrained, and context-sensitive ways in order to co-articulate 
themselves by means of utterances to larger-scale socio-cognitive-affective assemblages 
(Thibault, 2011b: 57-59). Participants draw on high order cultural-semantic invariants — 
wordings — such as the configuration of Chubby, eat, and stick in the utterance. The co-
articulation of my daughter to the particular aspect of the experiential topology that her 
utterance activates involves a process of corporeal schematization whereby vocal tract and 
other bodily gestures are re-shaped to form an utterance-trajectory. 
The wording is like a script that specifies the parameters within which vocal tract and other 
bodily dynamics self-organise to yield vocal tract and other bodily action that is in accordance 
with the attractor landscape that the wording Chubby was eating on his stick makes manifest. 
Vocal tract and other bodily dynamics are assimilated to this clause-level pattern and are 
reshaped accordingly so as to yield a performance of a whole-body-sense-making trajectory 
that is co-articulated with the situation. Intrinsic functional constraints on languaging mean that 
it is adaptive and able to deal with a vast range of different situations. A small number of 
intrinsic functional constraints on languaging as action system provide simplex principles for 
dealing with complex social environments (Berthoz, 2012/2009). Languaging operates 
according to simplex principles so that we can manage our relations with the complex 
environments we live in (Thibault, 2019). 
The addressee is not a passive receiver or decoder of a 'meaning' that is packaged in the 
utterance. These are simplistic and mechanistic ways of thinking that cannot do justice to the 
intrinsic complexity of living selves-in-languaging. Language can be modelled as if it were 
code-like, but such models are impoverished and reductive examples of how 'language' can be 
modelled as machines. The code model also applies to many machines. On the other hand, the 
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languaging of living selves has its primordial origins in phylogenetic, ontogenetic, and 
microgenetic processes that no non-living system can realise. If we reach far enough back into 
any of these processes on their respective time scales, we will discover traces of anticipatory 
dynamics and final causations that point to the complexity of living systems as distinct from 
the simplicity of machines. These anticipatory dynamics and final causations always imply a 
'why' and a 'because'. 
Languaging is whole-body co-participatory sense-making (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007). The 
addressee is an active co-participant together with the addressor. Languaging is a whole-body 
dynamics that is based on movement. It is grounded in the experience of our 
kinesic/haptic/kinaesthetic bodies in movement in the world. Languaging is a form of 
intentional body movement that is other-directed and which serves to move others to act, feel, 
perceive, think, and so on. Body-brain systems « shape themselves to accord with input they 
get by acting into the world » (Freeman 1995: 26). The neurobiologist Walter J. Freeman 
defines intentionality as « the process of a brain in action having the properties of unity, 
wholeness, and intent (the tension of taking in by stretching forth) ». The addressee is primed 
to be in a stance of expectation and attention (Freeman, 2000: 97). Utterances control and guide 
our and others’ choices and ongoing exploration of the world. If one views utterances as the 
passive encodings of either thought or external sensation in accordance with empiricist 
doctrine, one misses how languaging is a form of intentional body movement that is other-
directed and which serves to move others to act. 
Living systems « shape themselves to accord with input they get by acting into the world » 
(Freeman 1995: 26). Addressor and addressee alike move on together along the pathways laid 
down by languaging. The reception of someone's utterance by the addressee is a form of co-
participation whereby the addressee, in moving along with the movement of the addressor's 
utterance in a relationship of 'correspondence' (section 6), modifies and re-shapes his or her 
own brain and body dynamics in ways that co-articulate the addressor to the intent of the 
addressor's utterance and its unfolding affordance layout. On the part of the addressee, these 
movements may be less overt than those of the addressor, but they do nonetheless occur. As 
Freeman points out, the body changes its own form « to become similar to aspects of stimuli 
that are relevant to the intent that emerged from within the brain » (2000, 17). The addressee 
assimilates his or her body-brain dynamics to aspects of the utterance that are attended to and 
re-shapes their own dynamics accordingly. Whilst it is correct to say that the addressor is the 
primary producer of the utterance, it is no less correct to say that utterances and their meaning 
are co-produced. 
The addressor's utterance, like any other sensory stimulus, evokes a spike of neural activity. 
This spike of neural activity serves to select a self-organising pattern of neural activity that is 
created by the sensory cortex to which the stimulus is directed (Freeman, 1995: 66). This 
pattern of activity is not, Freeman points out, a representational copy of the stimulus received 
from the outside, but a brief surge of neural activity that constitutes the meaning and value of 
the stimulus for the self. These varying surges of neural activity constitute memories of the 
stimulus information, not representations of it. Rather than invariance structures that would 
suggest a representation, the lack of invariance structures in this neural activity shows that 
neural activity varies in accordance with memory-driven meanings that are assigned to the 
stimulus. These meanings are not constant, but may vary from occasion to occasion. These 
patterns depend on past learning about the stimulus that has been embedded in the modified 
synapses in cortical networks. The patterns are therefore unique to each individual and are not 
specific to the stimuli that triggered their construction. The brain’s response to the stimulus is 
the meaning that the stimulus has for the self in the context of the self’s past experience. The 
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function of the brain is not to create representations of external reality. Instead, it is to create 
meaning. 
Meaning in this sense is not linguistic meaning, but the meaning that is created by the processes 
of abstraction and generalization over the brain’s responses to events in the world as these 
events are assigned their place as personal meaning in relation to the accumulated history of 
personal meaning we call experience. In other words, the many individual engagements with 
the objects and events in the world in the life of the self are transformed into a global meaning 
potential by the brain’s own internal dynamics whenever the brain responds to external (and 
internal) events. This meaning potential is made and continually elaborated by the brain itself. 
The creation of meaning in this sense is what enables the self to lean into the world by a process 
of assimilation. Assimilation is the process of creating meaning that shapes body and brain so 
that the self can optimally engage with particular aspects of the world on particular occasions. 
When we actively concert our meanings with others in dialogically coordinated languaging, 
we make an effort, to varying degrees and with varying levels of motivation and commitment, 
to assimilate the meanings we interpret in others’ utterances to our own viewpoints, as 
constructed and articulated by own bodily and neural dynamics (Freeman, 2000: 15). 
Utterances have the capacity to partition or differentiate the experiential topology in local, 
context-sensitive ways as well as to coordinate the interactivity between agents. These high 
order cultural-semantic patterns (words and wordings) function as order parameters that 
organise the bodily dynamics of agents into structured, co-articulated relations between the 
different component processes of the emerging task — e.g., my daughter's utterance, her 
leaning towards the book lying on the bed, her grasping the book in her hand to make it into a 
'stick'; and her showing it to me--that are assembled into a particular task as the movement 
develops along its time-extended trajectory. The bodies of the two participants, together with 
relevant aspects of the situation, are in this way shaped into a coherent action trajectory for the 
performance of ecological work. Coherent patterns of body-brain activity shape and modulate 
time-dependent coherent action trajectories that are shaped so as to co-articulate a functional 
fit between self and environment. 
Fine-grained, micro-temporal voice and other bodily dynamics, on the other hand, are local 
constraints or « tuning parameters » (Saltzman & Kelso, 1983: 25). They are globally 
constrained by the lexicogrammatical order parameters to cohere in a vector field of action, for 
instance, as a declarative utterance that functions to activate and to indicate the CHUBBY-EAT-
STICK aspect of the experiential topology. The energy and intensity of the vector field sustains 
coordination of all aspects, including phonetic minutiae of voice dynamics, so that even the 
most minute and fleeting aspects of voice dynamics have their say. Global lexicogrammatical 
constraints are thus tuned by local constraints specified by fine-grained body dynamics that are 
specific to the immediate Agent-Environment Interaction System. These body dynamics 
provides agents with feedback that enables them to adjust the utterance trajectory more 
effectively in order that the agent can stay adaptive, aware, and sensitive to changing 
circumstances. Importantly, micro-temporal aspects of bodily dynamics induce bodily feelings 
— Damasio's (1999) somatic markers — that can bias action and perception. In their 
languaging, people learn to track a complex matrix of environmental organisation that is spread 
across diverse time and place scales and is, moreover, continuously modulated by a fluctuating 
heterarchy of norms and values. 
Utterances co-articulate relations of betweenness (Thibault, 2021b: chap. 2) that connect selves 
to selected aspects of their world. They are functional in the recursive self-maintenance and 
self-individuation of selves — not just of oneself, but of other selves too. An action is always 
attributed to a self rather than to some body part or subprocess of the self. The self is an 
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organised functional whole that persists in time. The actions that the self performs and that are 
sourceable at and attributable to the self are functional in the recursive self-maintenance of the 
self. It is the reflexivity of the self’s actions that is crucial here. The self is an integrated locus 
of action-potentials. The self’s actions extend from the self into its environment and back again 
as feedback loops — negative and positive — that regulate the flows of matter, energy, and 
information between the self and its environment. In recursively operating on its environment 
through context-sensitive selections from its action potentials, the recursive loops extending 
from self to environment that are established and maintained are functional in directing and 
organising the self qua functional whole as it explores and seeks functional fits with its 
environment. 
The shelf life of associationistic accounts of the sign as an associative relation between a form 
and a meaning, or a signifier and a signified, is long expired. However, it continues to linger 
on in linguistic and social semiotic accounts of the sign in the English-speaking world. In 
Saussure's conception, signifiers were associated with their signifieds by mechanistic internal 
processes along the syntagmatic and associative axes of coordination by the language 
mechanism. However, it has no way of showing that utterances are forms of mental process 
that are directed to posing and solving problems, finding solutions, exploring possibilities, 
testing hypotheses, and so on. If signs are determined by the workings of an internal 'language 
mechanism' to create psychological associations of signifiers and signified, they could not be 
manifestations of adaptive, intelligent human activity (see also Wettersten, 2019). Rather than 
the dead end of the associationistic psychological views of the sign as a pairing or an 
association of a form with a meaning (e.g., Adami, 2019; Bezemer & Jewitt, 2009; Saussure, 
1971/1915: 97-100), intrinsic functional constraints on languaging activity are the work of a 
complex non-optimized system (the self) that draws on the available resources in context-
sensitive ways in order to yield social and cognitive outcomes. Languaging is a manifestation 
of intelligent human action that enables selves to seek and to co-articulate functional fits 
between self and selected aspects of their social and cultural environments. This further means 
that simplex internal processes that have their origins in the pre-linguistic infra-structure of the 
self are corporeally schematized and entrained to and shaped by global order parameters — 
e.g., lexicogrammatical pattern — that enable selves to interact in complex social worlds. 
Rather than genetic or other hardwired constraints or rules that prefigure the final outcome, the 
microgenetic derivational trajectory of an utterance-in-becoming is constrained by functional 
semiotic constraints that are intrinsic to both languaging as a form of highly productive action 
and to the capacity of persons to participate in it (Bickhard, 1987; Deacon, 2003). These 
constraints are not built into the human brain, but are required by the very nature of symbolic 
action and therefore delimit the possibility space within which languages have evolved 
(Deacon, 2003), how they are learned in ontogenesis (Bickhard, 2004), and how particular 
utterances individuate in microgenesis. The precursors of these linguistic constraints, I argue, 
are grounded in the intersubjective character of action-perception and constitute the 
prelinguistic infrastructure that is the essential ground of all languaging activity. 
Languaging is self-organising constraint-satisfying activity. It is a mode of action that is 
constrained by what one wants to do, seeks to achieve, anticipated consequences, and so on. 
Languaging is also oriented to and influenced by social and cultural norms of what is desirable, 
permitted, and so on. Internal constraints deriving from the pre-linguistic infra-structure and 
external constraints deriving from the semiotic, social, and cultural environments give rise to 
utterances. An utterance is the outcome of a selection-and-variation process along its entire 
microgenetic derivational trajectory that has its origins in a global or more holistic personal 
feeling-meaning. Languaging is time-extended activity not just in the sense that the utterance 
occurs over a determinate span of time, but also because its effects and consequences are 
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extended over times, places, and persons that languaging seeks to modulate and affect in some 
way. The incipient antecedent configuration that constitutes the origin of the utterance in the 
core self does not pre-specify all of the finer details of the final output.  
According to the orthogenetic principle proposed by Werner & Kaplan (1984/1963), all mental 
processes undergo a progression from global and integrated brain and body structures and 
functions to more finely articulated and differentiated ones. In similar terms, Brown (2015: 18, 
105) explains that actions are first organised in the proximal core of postural control. From its 
basis in the axial muscles, an action such as reaching for a cup of tea is progressively more 
differentiated into peripheral limb activity such as the movement of the arm towards the cup 
and the further differentiation of fine-grained distal (wrist and finger) muscles. According to 
microgenetic theory, this progression from global to axial and focal to distal is no less true of 
language (Tucker et al, 2008: 45-46). Languaging is a form of skilled action that has its origins 
in the embodied brain in global, more holistic structures of the core self. These holistic 
structures arise from limbic cognition at the onset of the mental process, as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: The vectorial nature of utterances as structures of action originating in the affective dynamics 
of the core self, showing the progressive articulation-differentiation of personal meaning as a 
linguistically structured vocal tract action, i.e., as a gesture-sound-wording complex, that has its deep 
origins in the core self 
 
More holistic, less differentiated structure unfolds as microgenetic process on a milliseconds 
time scale of brain and body process towards more differentiated focal structures that are 
articulated as vocal tract (and other) gestural activity. These initial, primordial holistic 
structures are not totally undifferentiated. The term ‘holistic’ refers to an initial delimitation—
itself a differentiation — that is made within a field of potentialities and which lays the ground 
for the emergence of a more differentiated structure (Sonesson, 2013: 536-537). The parts of a 
structure differentiate out of an initial, more holistic delimitation, in Sonesson’s sense), that 
nonetheless serves as an organising principle that relates its parts both to each other and to the 
whole. The utterance is in accordance with this initial holistic 'delimitation' at the same time 
that its further microgenetic development is a progressive specification of more and more 
detail. 
When languaging is re-stratified as horizontal vectors of action rather than vertical hierarchies 
of formal levels, we see that the phasal transitions of an utterance-in-becoming constitute a 
constant process of re-articulation of a mobile and transformative process flow that has its 
origins in and is animated by affect and desire. Languaging is then, as Félix Guattari 
(2016/2011) theorised, an incessant production of desire. Paolo Fabbri (2020: 140) points out 
that Hjelmslev (1954) viewed his stratified conception of the linguistic sign as an « abstract 
machine » consisting of the intersection of two forms: expression form and content form. 
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the constant re-articulation of content as form and form as content that gives rise not to a static 
structure, but to « una linguistica dei flussi e dei processi » [a linguistics of flows and processes] 
based on, as Fabbri observes, an immanent trans-semiotics able to be manifested in all 
perceivable substances (2020: 141). 
Guattari (2016/2011: 143) is right: The abstract machine of language cannot be explained by 
the developmental stages the child is said to traverse. Nor can it be explained by the phasal 
transitions that occur during the microgenetic derivation of an utterance. These are, rather, 
different aspects of the articulation of self to the social semiotic order and thus the stratification 
of the self (Thibault, 2021a: chap. 2). The processes of stratification that have fixed and 
stabilized — territorialised — the identity of a particular self are abstract machines of desire in 
families, schools, play groups, social media, etc. that latch themselves onto what Guattari 
(2016/2011: 144) calls the child's « intensities of desire », subjects them, and stratifies them to 
its logic. The discussion of Halliday's account of the transition from infant proto-language to 
'language' shows the ways in which language crystallizes « heteroclite components » (Guattari, 
2016/2011: 145) such as his relations with the three key adults in his meaning group, their 
presences and absences, the child's desires, the parents' desires, and so on. 
Microgenesis shows how languaging, far from being reducible to a two-dimensional structural 
distinction between the associative (paradigmatic) and syntagmatic axes of coordination, 
crystallizes multiple lines of flight such as archaic affects, bodily habits, desires, fantasy, 
feeling, imagery, neurohormonal flows, oneiric elements, values, and so on (see also Bondì, 
2017). Catherine's recounting to me of Chubby's encounter with the food stick reveals other 
fixings and stabilizations, including the territorialisation of an interworld that includes me, 
Catherine, and Chubby. Her desires and fantasies with respect to Chubby. Her acting out of 
these fantasies through bodily mimesis partly under verbal guidance. Her narrativisation of her 
experience to me. The separation of Chubby-time from the other periodisations of her daily 
life. The abstract machine of languaging brings together component processes from different 
scalar levels of social semiotic organisation: 
 
L+1: The connecting of what Guattari (2016/2011: 146) calls the « dominant social 
stratifications » to the abstract mchine; 
L: the crystallisation of and co-articulation of individual desire to the abstract machine 
of languaging; 
L-1: the self's desire. 
 
The abstract machine of languaging co-articulates the self and its desires to dominant social 
semiotic stratifications and its repressive powers and disciplinary regimes that take over the 
child and de-stratify and then re-stratify him or her in accordance with dominant social norms. 
The orthodox take up of Saussure (1971/1915; 1993/1907, 1910-11) commits the 
associationistic error identified by Bergson of « reducing the self to an aggregate of conscious 
states: sensations, feelings, and ideas » (Bergson, 1950/1889: 165), which are seen as « no more 
than is expressed in their name » (Bergson, 1950/1889: 165). Saussure assumes that the 
underlying internal conditions of utterance construction can be explained in terms of the 
external products that are derived from them. The latter are projected back into the underlying 
unconscious processes. In this way, Saussure only retains their impersonal aspects and fails to 
see how it is the interpenetration of all of these psychic states within a definite person that 
enables them to assume the "particular colouring" that is a mark of the whole personality and 
character of the self. Bergson explains: 
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[...] there is no need to associate a number of conscious states in order to rebuild the 
person, for the whole personality is in a single one of them, provided that we know 
how to choose it. And the outward manifestation of this inner state will be just what 
is called a free act, since the self alone will have been the author of it, and since it 
will express the whole of the self (Bergson, 1950/1889: 165-166). 
 
The interpenetration of different underlying processes rather than their aggregation gives 
utterances their « particular colouring ». They are imbued with qualities of the self who utters 
them. Linguists have viewed utterances as 'combinations' of elements on analogy with the 
metalinguistic models provided by writing. From the point of view of their microgenetic origins 
in the interpenetration of many layers of intra-psychic process, their « particular colouring » is 
more in the character of a blend of interpenetrating processes rather than a combination of 
distinct elements. Often very subtle changes in the colouring of the final product — the 
utterance — register changes in the internal conditions of the self as the self, processes and 
adjusts to changing internal and external conditions. Changes in the self's internal conditions 
prepare for and set up how the self will respond in its languaging to changes in its 
environmental conditions. A continuous virtual space of blended intra-psychic processes 
establishes the initial parameters that can potentially affect the next phase of the microgenetic 
construction process. In so influencing it, the given parameter is selected while others are de-
selected or pruned. In carrying the selected parameter to the next phase of the derivational 
trajectory, the selected parameter constrains the further development of the trajectory of the 
utterance-in-becoming. 
In the final utterance, the particular affective and other colouring is present in the distinctive 
blend of metafunctional constraints that give final shape to the utterance. Feeling-meaning 
blends and their striving for articulation along vectors of action and orientation are the primitive 
driving force of the microgenetic construction process. 
 
 
8. Conclusion: Languaging and the Riddle of the Living Chicken 
 
In the simple world of mechanism, as distinct from the complexity of living systems, the 
standard scientific question is: what can we learn about the chicken? We try to learn about 
chickens by taking them apart, analysing their component parts, and trying to figure out how 
the parts combine to form the functioning whole. But an analysis of the parts cannot answer 
the question 'why did the chicken cross the road?' The chicken's legs -- essential for its crossing 
the road — cannot be meaningfully separated from the rest of the chicken. We don't ask: why 
did the chicken's legs cross the road? However, that is how the language sciences have often 
proceeded with respect to languaging. Languaging is separated from living persons and treated 
as an 'object of study' in its own right. However, my contention is that we cannot separate 
languaging from persons in the way that we can separate and then re-assemble the different 
parts of a machine. We need to pose a different question: what makes living languaging live? 
The more we build simplified models of ourselves and our social life on analogy with 
machines, the less able will we be able to develop the conceptual structures for understanding 
ourselves and our place in the world of the living. 
The ontology of living systems is different from that of machines. We build machines, as Rosen 
points out, « sequentially, by accretion, one structure at a time, one function at a time » (2000: 
291). We do have talking machines like Siri. However, Siri does not language. Siri is 
programmed to recognise and respond to a bunch of patterns on the basis of rote production 
rules. However, Siri's pattern recognition abilities are devoid of motive. Siri has syntax but no 
semantics. Siri does not live in a world. Siri does not live in time. Living systems are of a 
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different kind. Siri is a simple manifestation of some aspects of the complexity of living 
systems that can recognise patterns (Matusov, 2020). Siri does not and cannot participate in 
creative dialogic languaging. Siri has no feelings, no interests, no motivation, no point of view, 
and so on. 
But what can we learn from the chicken? When I was in primary school, we often told the 
riddle, « Why did the chicken cross the road? » No one could ever come up with a definitive 
answer. The question is well posed. The answer is not so simple. The chicken is a complex 
living organism, not a simple machine. It doesn't need me to impose my answer on it. It has its 
own reasons, like all living systems. Any answer to the riddle imposes my answer or your 
answer on the chicken. The answers are self-referring: they point to our human perspectives 
and our human ways of understanding. They do not and cannot answer the question from the 
chicken's perspective. However, they do raise a fundamental point. Living systems of all kinds 
are not simply reactive. They are guided by an anticipatory dynamic that draws them into their 
future. They do things to augment functional capabilities and to exploit organismic and 
environmental resources to enable them to do so. They co-articulate themselves with their 
worlds in ways that generate these possibilities. However, these behaviours are not 
programmed. The road is a human technology that forces the chicken's behaviour. The chicken 
is guided by an implicit why dynamic that is deeply felt, and which can only be answered by 
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